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TahoeBlue

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But they're are special friends.....



http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2009/01/22/socal_men_accused_of_illegal_china_export_import/
SoCal men accused of illegal China export, import
January 22, 2009

LOS ANGELES—The owner of a San Bernardino County electronics company was charged with illegally exporting restricted components to China and trafficking in millions of dollars worth of counterfeit Sony and Cisco devices, federal authorities announced Wednesday.

Michael Ming Zhang, 49, of Rancho Cucamonga was arrested Tuesday on a federal grand jury indictment handed up last week.

A second businessman, Policarpo Coronado Gamboa, 40, of Foothill Ranch also was arrested. Both made federal court appearances on Tuesday and were released on bond pending arraignment, U.S. attorney's spokesman Thom Mrozek said.

Zhang could face up to 125 years in prison if convicted of all counts and Gamboa could face up to five years, federal authorities said.

"Mr. Zhang is innocent until proven guilty" and will exercise his full constitutional rights, his newly appointed federal public defender, Thomas Kielty, said in a statement. Kielty said he could not comment further until he had reviewed the evidence against his client.

A call to Gamboa's public defender, Kimberly Savo, was not immediately returned.

Zhang was president and general manager of J.J. Electronics, an importer and exporter of electronic components run out of his home, according to the indictment and an FBI statement . Gamboa owned Sereton Technology Inc., in Foothill Ranch.

Zhang was accused of exporting more than 200 computer memory devices to China in 2006 and 2008 without the proper export licenses. The items were restricted because they had both civilian and military uses.

He also was accused of trafficking in at least 4,300 counterfeit Cisco electronic components in 2008. The devices had an estimated retail market value of more than $3.3 million, according to the FBI statement.

A separate indictment accused Zhang and Gamboa of conspiracy and counterfeit goods trafficking. It contends they tried to sell 3,500 counterfeit Sony Memory Sticks from China in 2007 and 2008.


http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2008/10/3-indicted-for.html

3 indicted for illegal export to China space agency
10/3/2008

The Justice Department has charged three men with allegedly conspiring to export carbon-fiber material to the Chinese agency that builds satellites and spacecraft.

The government says the indictment, returned in federal court in Minnesota, underscores the rise in illegal exports of weapons, military equipment and national security technology to China and Iran. For the past two years, Iran was the top destination for restricted U.S. technology, the Associated Press says.

Of 145 people or companies charged with illegally exporting restricted technology last year, 43% were shipping to Iran and China. Of those, 74 involved Iran and 23 China. More than 60 defendants were charged with illegal exports to Mexico, mostly weapons.

This year has seen a 30% increase in violations.

"Keeping U.S. weapons technology and other restricted materials from falling into the wrong hands — and from being used against our allies, our troops overseas or Americans at home — is a top counterintelligence priority," Assistant Attorney General Pat Rowan said in a statement. Read it here.

Today's indictment charged Jian Wei Ding, Kok Tong Lim and Ping Cheng with seeking to send carbon-fiber to the China Academy of Space Technology. Besides spacecraft and rockets, carbon fiber is also used to enrich uranium.

Jian Wei Ding and Kok Tong Lim are residents of Singapore and affiliated with a Singaporean import/export company known as FirmSpace, Pte Ltd. Ping Cheng is a resident of New York and the sole shareholder of Prime Technology Corporation.


http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/16/news/mn-56683
China Admits Neutron Bomb-Building Capability

China publicly confirmed Thursday what international security experts have known for years: that it possesses the technology to build a neutron bomb.

The Chinese government said its scientists developed the know-how during the 1970s and ’80s, when the Cold War escalated between the U.S. and Soviet Union. China exploded a neutron bomb in 1988–a fact widely known among intelligence experts around the world–but never openly acknowledged its capabilities.

Official confirmation came Thursday with the release of a detailed rebuttal of the Cox report, the recent U.S. congressional investigation that alleged widespread Chinese espionage and theft of U.S. military technology, including the capability to produce a neutron bomb.

TahoeBlue

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Our very special friends...

A lot of technology was moved during the Clinton administration. I expect that to resume with Obama/Clinton....


http://cns.miis.edu/research/china/coxrep/

Resources on China
The Consequences of Chinese Espionage to International Security: A Cox Report Review
The 700-page Cox report, released on April 25, should be read in conjunction with the "DCI Statement on Damage Assessment" issued by the Central Intelligence Agency on April 21. While the Cox report was written by a bipartisan congressional committee concerned with American security and commercial interests, the DCI assessment was prepared by an independent panel of senior nuclear and security experts concerned with the damage caused by the espionage.

While much of the Cox report was concerned with the prevention of future losses by improving counterintelligence and export controls, the essence of the Cox report is that the People’s Republic of China stole over a period of 20 years, through espionage, "classified design information on the United States’ most advanced thermonuclear weapons." The report explains what exactly was stolen, from where it was stolen, and how and when it was stolen. The report also predicts how the PRC might use the information to accelerate the improvement of its military force.

The principal data lost, in the form of nuclear test codes, computer design models and other data forms, were in three critical areas:

nuclear warhead modernization
missile guidance and design technology
electromagnetic weapons technology
Based on this data, China's nuclear warhead modernization would most affect U.S. security in three areas:

Road-mobile ICBM’s
Submarine-launched ICBMs

ICBM’s with multiple warheads (MRVs or MIRV’s)
The missile guidance and design technology that would most affect U.S. security would be the technology permitting China to improve the accuracy of its complete range of missiles which could threaten U.S. troops in Asia, American allies and the North American Continent.

Finally, the information on electromagnetic weapons could be used to develop space-based weapons to attack satellites or missiles and could be used to threaten American submarines.

The DCI Damage Assessment noted that China’s principal motivation is to develop survivable long-range missiles that place U.S. and Russian populations at risk in order to prevent intimidation by either country (a second-strike capability). This report recognized that China had obtained weapons design concepts and weaponization features, and that the information did make a significant contribution to China’s second-strike capability. However, it did temper the Cox report somewhat by noting:

The information obtained was from a variety of sources, including open sources, not just espionage.

The information was used more to inform and guide China's weapons development programs than to copy U.S. designs.

Significant deficiencies still exist in China’s weapons development programs and to date the Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent modernization of their deployed strategic force.

China has had a MRV capability for many years but has not deployed any.

There is no information available that China has shared U.S. technical information with other countries.  (Hah - Pakistan - North Korea?)
While the Cox Report concludes that China's espionage programs have resulted in the acquisition of "classified information on seven thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal," the consequences of this are less clear and must be taken into the context of China's security strategy and technical capabilities.


China has been modernizing and professionalizing the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA) for more than 20 years, not just its nuclear forces. The PLA is improving its personnel through better selection and training, it is streamlining its organizations and improving its weapons systems through purchase, reverse engineering, intelligence collection and domestic research and development. Though China is committed to modernizing its nuclear forces, it must be viewed in the context of China's total military modernization effort. It will continue to improve its military, as all nations will. However, it still has only conducted 45 nuclear tests since 1964 and only developed possible MRV capability in 1981 and neutron bomb capability in 1988.

As stated by the DCI Damage Assessment, China is modernizing their nuclear forces to preserve their second strike capability and to counter future ballistic missile defenses, not to develop a first strike capability. Because of this, China's nuclear forces represent less of a threat to the United States than did Soviet nuclear forces. The United States nuclear forces consist of 11,000 ICBMs, while Chinese nuclear forces include only 20 missiles capable of hitting the United States. While China could rapidly expand its nuclear force, it has not shown an inclination to do so. In fact, China's ability to quickly design and deploy complex weapons systems is questionable. For example, China has not yet deployed the DF-31 ballistic missile, which has been in development for 15 years and still has only one ballistic missile nuclear submarine after launching its first in 1986.

China values weapons systems not only militarily but also politically. Nuclear weapons improve China's national prestige and influence by exhibiting super- power status. Possession of nuclear weapons are also seen as a deterrent to what China sees as U.S. hegemonistic aggression. Also, China's limited resources will be focused on deterring U.S. involvement in a conflict with Taiwan, rather than preparing for a nuclear war with the United States.
China's espionage must also be viewed in the broader context of its arms control and nonproliferation policies. While China has been seen as a proliferator of missile technology, in recent years China has come to realize that arms control can also enhance its national security and has consequently increased its membership in nonproliferation and arms control regimes such as the Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. Based on this broader context, China's theft of US nuclear secrets must be viewed with concern, but should not be the defining issue in US-Sino relations. Like every country, China will modernize its armed forces through all available means and the United States must be fully aware of this. However, to really achieve national security, the dialogue between the United States and China will need to continue in order to understand both country's frame of reference and to develop a true strategic partnership for the future.
 
http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/security/panel-warns-of-chinese-computer-espionage/2008/11/21/1226770695717.html
Panel warns of Chinese computer espionage
November 21, 2008 - 10:55AM

A US congressional advisory panel says China has stepped up computer espionage attacks on the American government, defence contractors and businesses.

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission also said in its annual report to Congress that aggressive Chinese space programs are allowing Beijing to target US military forces better.

"China is stealing vast amounts of sensitive information from US computer networks," said Larry Wortzel, chairman of the commission set up by Congress in 2000 to advise, investigate and report on US-China issues.

The commission of six Democrats and six Republicans said in the unanimously approved report that China's massive military modernisation and its "impressive but disturbing" space and computer warfare capabilities "suggest China is intent on expanding its sphere of control even at the expense of its Asian neighbours and the United States".

The commission recommended that Congress provide money for US government programs that would monitor and protect computer networks.

Messages left with the Chinese Embassy in Washington were not immediately returned. But officials in Beijing have responded to past reports by saying China does not try to undermine other countries' interests and seeks healthy ties with the United States.

The report comes two months before president-elect Barack Obama takes office. The Democratic Obama administration probably will continue the Republican Bush administration's efforts to work with and encourage China, a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council that the United States needs in nuclear confrontations with Iran and North Korea.

During the campaign for president, Obama said that "China is rising, and it's not going away", adding that Beijing is "neither our enemy nor our friend; they're competitors".

In the commission's report, military strategist Wang Huacheng is quoted as calling US dependence on space assets and information technology its "soft ribs".

China's space program is "steadily increasing the vulnerability of US assets", the report said. For instance, improvements in satellite imagery allow China to locate US carrier battle groups more accurately, faster and from farther away.

People's Liberation Army officer and author Cai Fengzhen is quoted as saying that the "area above ground, airspace and outer space are inseparable and integrated. They are the strategic commanding height of modern informationalised warfare."

"If this becomes Chinese policy," the report said, "it could set the stage for conflict with the United States and other nations that expect the right of passage for their spacecraft."

The commission also criticised China for violating commitments to avoid trade-distorting measures, adopting new laws that may restrict foreign access to China's markets and keeping its currency undervalued.

It recommended that Congress enact legislation to respond to China's currency manipulation and create enforceable disclosure requirements on investments in the United States for foreign sovereign wealth funds and other foreign state-controlled companies.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/02/AR2008040203372.html

Recent Espionage Cases Involving China
March 24, 2008: Chi Mak, a former engineer at a naval contractor, is sentenced to 24 1/2 years in prison for conspiring to export warship technology to China. He was also convicted of acting as an unregistered foreign agent of China.

March 7, 2008: WaveLab, a Reston company, pleads guilty in federal court to illegally exporting "controlled power amplifiers," which have military applications, to China between February 2006 and October 2006.


Feb. 11, 2008: Dongfan Chung, a former Boeing engineer, is arrested after being indicted for allegedly stealing information about the space shuttle, the Delta IV rocket and the Air Force C-17 and passing it to China as an unregistered agent. The indictment said he made many trips to China, giving lectures and meeting with Chinese officials
Jan. 25, 2008: Ding Zhengxing and Su Yang are arrested in Saipan for allegedly trying to buy and export amplifiers used in digital radios and wireless area networks that are controlled by U.S. export laws.

Dec. 3, 2007: Philip Cheng is sentenced in California to two years in prison for brokering the export to China of Panther series infrared cameras, which have night-vision technology.

Oct. 31, 2007: Bing Xu of Nanjing, China, is charged in New Jersey with attempting to export military goggles from the United States to China. Court papers claim he arrived in New York shortly after his Chinese employer transferred $14,000 to pay for the equipment, which is sold under restrictions.

Oct. 26, 2007: Noshir Gowadia is charged in Hawaii with transmitting information to China related to making cruise missile exhausts hard to detect.

Oct. 18, 2007: Qing Li is charged in California with conspiracy to export military-grade accelerometers, which have some applications in smart bombs, missile development and what the Justice Department described as "calibrating the g-forces of nuclear and chemical explosions."

Sept. 26, 2007: Lan Lee and Yuefei Ge are charged in California with economic espionage and theft of trade secrets from two companies on behalf of a Chinese military program.

Aug. 1, 2007: Xiaodong Sheldon Meng pleads guilty in California to violating the Economic Espionage Act to benefit China's Navy Research Center. He exported source code for simulation software for the precision training of fighter pilots.

Aug. 1, 2007: Yang Fung, president of Excellence Engineering Electronics, pleads guilty in San Francisco to illegally providing microwave integrated circuits to China, in violation of Commerce Department rules.

March 27, 2007: ITT Corp. pleads guilty and pays a $100 million fine for exporting night-vision data to China, Singapore and Britain, one of the largest such fines for export-control violations.






leverForTruth

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This probably include various organs also! Do they not send organs to the us?

TahoeBlue

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http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=23608&article=Chinese+Cyber-Espionage&t=1&c=4

Chinese Cyber-Espionage
By Email[Tuesday, January 13, 2009 10:42]
 
Big Brother in a Mao Cap

By Maura Moynihan

"If you use Windows, the Chinese Communist Party knows how to hack into your laptop. If you have friends and associates in China, they're reading your emails."


On December 16th 2008, Time Magazine announced the annual People Of the Year List. Barak Obama topped the list, and one runner-up was China's Zhang Yimou, the epic filmmaker and Olympic impresario, for creating "arguably the grandest spectacle of the new millennium," the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics Games, which "showcased the rise of China as a world power."

The bland celebration of China's version of Leni Riefenstahl dodged the uncomfortable truth that the Olympics enabled the Chinese Communist Party to expand their intelligence operations within the corporations and governments who flew to Beijing for a sports party. China is now flexing its post-Olympic power with an aggressive new cyber-espionage campaign, targeting government, military and civilians with equal force. If you use Windows, the Chinese Communist Party to knows how to hack into your laptop. If you have friends and associates in China, they're reading your emails.

The Pentagon, the State Department and the US Congress have been monitoring China's cyber intelligence campaigns for years. The Congressional Record has a long list of hearings on the matter. In 2008 press statements, the Pentagon reports that Chinese cyber espionage has "increased dramatically" before and after the Olympic Games.

During preparations for the Olympics, China installed massive new surveillance and security systems with the generous assist of the U.S. corporations Honeywell, General Electric, United Technologies and IBM. Throughout the Olympic gold rush the Bush administration routinely sidestepped the 1990 law stipulating that high-tech must not benefit the Chinese military. After all, the People's Republic of China was a paying customer and owns a majority share of U.S. Treasury Bills.

The craven posturing of the Olympic Committee and their corporate sponsors allowed Beijing party bosses to break every pledge to improve human rights, duly sworn when they lobbied for the contract. And what has the result been of this blind quest for corporate profit? On November 20, 2008, the bipartisan U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission sent its annual report to the United States Congress. It states: "China is targeting U.S. government and commercial computers for espionage (and) is stealing vast amounts of sensitive information from U.S. computer networks."

The website of an independent research consortium http://www.infowar-monitor.net/ provides updates on China's web infiltration methods. One alarming new report describes tracking devices carefully affixed into computers manufactured in China that route information to the Chinese Communist Party's Public Security Bureau. Cyber intelligence is linked into a vast human intelligence gathering operation of Chinese citizens recruited to spy for the Motherland known as "a thousand grains of sand.". This network involves tourists, businessmen and some of the over 100,000 Chinese students who study overseas each year. Every one is questioned by intelligence officers before and after their foreign tour and offered lucrative rewards for valued intelligence.

China's military academies are also diligently training thousands of young workers in computer hacking. Larry M. Wortzel, the author of a 2007 US Army War College report on China's cyber campaigns said: "The thing that should give us pause is that in many Chinese military manuals they identify the U.S. as the country they are most likely to go to war with. They are moving very rapidly to master this new form of warfare." Two Chinese army hackers produced a "virtual guidebook for electronic warfare and jamming" after studying dozens of US and NATO manuals on military tactics.

Chinese cyber hackers have made numerous incursions into classified US networks. In November 2006, Retired Air Force Major General Richard Goetze, a Naval War College professor, said the Chinese "took down" the entire Naval War College computer network--an operation that prompted the U.S. Strategic Command to raise the security alert level for the Pentagon's 12,000 computer networks and 5 million computers. In June 2007, 150 computers in the $1.75 billion computer network at the Department of Homeland Security was quietly with programs that sent an unknown quantity of information to a Chinese-language Web site. Unisys Corporation, the manager of the DHS computers, allegedly covered up the penetration for three months.

Do a brief web search and you will find a long list of U.S. educated, high level Chinese-born agents serving time in U.S. prisons for spying and stealing military secrets for their homeland. Last fall FBI agents warned the Obama and McCain campaigns that Chinese networks were monitoring their computers. In June 2008, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA.) revealed that computers in the House International Relations Committee had been hacked by Chinese agents. "These cyber attacks permitted the source to probe our computers to evaluate our system's defenses, and to view and copy information," said Wolf. "My suspicion is that I was targeted by Chinese sources because of my long history of speaking out about China's abysmal human rights record."

On Feb. 15, 2006, representatives of Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and Cisco Systems were summoned before the House International Relations Committee to defend what Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.) called a "sickening collaboration" with the Chinese government that was "decapitating the voice of the dissidents." The web executives defended their dealings with the Chinese government on the grounds that China is a global market.

The global market provides endless opportunities for cyber-espionage. A February 2005 report from the Defense Science Board states "a significant migration of critical microelectronics manufacturing from the United States to other foreign countries has [occurred] and will continue to occur." America's defense systems are based on "trusted and classified" microchips. The February 2005 Defense Science Board report said, "Trust cannot be added to integrated circuits after fabrication; electrical testing and reverse engineering cannot be relied upon to detect undesired alterations in military integrated circuits."

After Deng Xiaopeng took Chairman Mao to the shopping mall, Wall Street analysts proclaimed that China's Maoists were different from Stalin's Bolsheviks, and that Coca Cola would magically engender democracy within a totalitarian state. China's Maoists are different; they made the economy work without dismantling state surveillance and control.

The financial tsunami that gushed out of Wall Street this fall forced the closure of over 30 Chinese factories, the ones that make the plastic Santas, socks and other such junk available at Walmart. But plenty more Chinese factories are churning out computers, digital chips, satellites, and rockets for the high-tech universe that China has staked out as the next frontier of world war. Let's hope that the only thing "Made in China" this Christmas is a plastic Santa--not spyware in our computers, where Big Brother, wearing, a Mao cap, is shifting through our cyber profiles.

TahoeBlue

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The Chinese Nuclear Weapons Program: Problems of Intelligence Collection and Analysis, 1964-1972 Edited By William Burr March 31, 2000http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB26/index.html

Link to DCI STATEMENT ON DAMAGE ASSESSMENT review:
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/news/dci042199.html
...

China obtained by espionage classified US nuclear weapons information that probably accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons. This collection program allowed China to focus successfully down critical paths and avoid less promising approaches to nuclear weapon designs.


China obtained at least basic design information on several modern US nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II (W88).
China also obtained information on a variety of US weapon design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutron bomb.
We cannot determine the full extent of weapon information obtained. For example, we do not know whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were acquired.
We believe it is more likely that the Chinese used US design information to inform their own program than to replicate US weapon designs.
China's technical advances have been made on the basis of classified and unclassified information derived from espionage, contact with US and other countries' scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified US weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development. The relative contribution of each cannot be determined.

Link to the Cox report: http://www.house.gov/coxreport

Chapter 2: http://www.house.gov/coxreport/chapfs/ch2.html

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen classified information on all of the United States' most advanced thermonuclear warheads,
The stolen U.S. secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and successfully test modern strategic thermonuclear weapons.
in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information
The W-88 is a miniaturized, tapered thermonuclear warhead. It is the United States' most sophisticated strategic thermonuclear weapon.
 the PRC has stolen classified U.S. information about neutron bomb warheads from a U.S. national weapons laboratory.
the Select Committee is aware of other PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets.
the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen U.S. design information for the development of the PRC's new generation strategic thermonuclear warheads
People's Liberation Army (PLA) mobile ICBMs, the DF-31, may be tested in 1999 and could be deployed as soon as 2002.
PRC's collection of intelligence on smaller U.S. thermonuclear warheads began in the 1970s

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/04/02/ST2008040204050.html?sid=ST2008040204050

Chinese Spy 'Slept' In U.S. for 2 Decades
Espionage Network Said to Be Growing

Prosecutors called Chi Mak the "perfect sleeper agent," though he hardly looked the part. For two decades, the bespectacled Chinese-born engineer lived quietly with his wife in a Los Angeles suburb, buying a house and holding a steady job with a U.S. defense contractor, which rewarded him with promotions and a security clearance. Colleagues remembered him as a hard worker who often took paperwork home at night.

Eventually, Mak's job gave him access to sensitive plans for Navy ships, submarines and weapons. These he secretly copied and sent via courier to China -- fulfilling a mission that U.S. officials say he had been planning since the 1970s.

Mak was sentenced last week to 24 1/2 years in prison by a federal judge who described the lengthy term as a warning to China not to "send agents here to steal America's military secrets." But it may already be too late: According to U.S. intelligence and Justice Department officials, the Mak case represents only a small facet of an intelligence-gathering operation that has long been in place and is growing in size and sophistication.

The Chinese government, in an enterprise that one senior official likened to an "intellectual vacuum cleaner," has deployed a diverse network of professional spies, students, scientists and others to systematically collect U.S. know-how, the officials said. Some are trained in modern electronic techniques for snooping on wireless computer transactions. Others, such as Mak, are technical experts who have been in place for years and have blended into their communities.

"Chi Mak acknowledged that he had been placed in the United States more than 20 years earlier, in order to burrow into the defense-industrial establishment to steal secrets," Joel Brenner, the head of counterintelligence for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, said in an interview. "It speaks of deep patience," he said, and is part of a pattern.

Other recent prosecutions illustrate the scale of the problem. Mak, whose sentence capped an 18-month criminal probe, was the second U.S. citizen in the past two weeks to stand before a federal judge after being found guilty on espionage-related charges.

On Monday, former Defense Department analyst Gregg W. Bergersen pleaded guilty in Alexandria to charges that he gave classified information on U.S. weapons sales to a businessman who shared the data with a Chinese official.

In March, the Reston company WaveLab pleaded guilty to violating export laws when it shipped militarily sensitive power amplifiers to China, according to court papers. A lawyer for the company said it neglected to get proper licenses and did not engage in "underhanded" behavior.

Dongfan Chung, a Boeing engineer arrested in February for allegedly passing classified space shuttle and rocket documents to Chinese officials, was accused in court documents of responding to orders from Beijing as long ago as 1979 -- making him a second alleged longtime agent.

Yesterday, federal prosecutors in Chicago indicted a software engineer for allegedly stealing business trade secrets and trying to take more than 1,000 paper and electronic documents from a telecommunications company on a one-way trip to China last year.

The cases are among at least a dozen investigations of Chinese espionage that have yielded criminal charges or guilty pleas in the past year. Since 2000, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials have launched more than 540 investigations of illegal technology exports to China.

The FBI recently heightened its counterintelligence operations against Chinese activities in the United States after Director Robert S. Mueller III cited "substantial concern" about aggressive attempts to use students, scientists and "front companies" to acquire military secrets.

Recent prosecutions indicate that Chinese agents have infiltrated sensitive military programs pertaining to nuclear missiles, submarine propulsion technology, night-vision capabilities and fighter pilot training -- all of which could help China modernize its programs while developing countermeasures against advanced weapons systems used by the United States and its allies.

"The intelligence services of the People's Republic of China pose a significant threat both to the national security and to the compromise of U.S. critical national assets," said William Carter, an FBI spokesman. "The PRC will remain a significant threat for a long time as they attempt to develop their military capabilities and to develop their economy in order to compete in today's world economy."

While military technology appears to be the top prize, the Chinese effort is also aimed at commercial and industrial technologies, which often are poorly protected, several officials said. "Espionage used to be a problem for the FBI, CIA and military, but now it's a problem for corporations," Brenner said. "It's no longer a cloak-and-dagger thing. It's about computer architecture and the soundness of electronic systems."

Calls placed to the Chinese Embassy in Washington requesting comment on recent spy cases were not returned. But Chinese officials have repeatedly denied that their country is stealing military technology. "We have reiterated many times that allegations that China stole U.S. military secrets are groundless and made out of ulterior motives," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said at a recent news conference in Beijing, commenting on the Mak case.

But U.S. intelligence and defense officials say China has been able to use technology of U.S. origin in a new generation of advanced naval destroyers and quiet-running, stealthy submarines.

Some of those secrets may have been obtained with the help of Mak, a 67-year-old electrical engineer who became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1985 along with his wife, Rebecca Chiu Mak. The two settled in Southern California, where Mak eventually accepted a job with Power Paragon, a defense contractor that specialized in advanced naval propulsion technology. In 1996, Mak was given a security clearance at the "secret" level, which gave him access to sensitive engineering details for U.S. ships and submarines.

In 2003, Mak became the subject of an intensive federal investigation that included court-ordered wiretaps, secret property searches and the clandestine installation of a video camera inside his home. Through surveillance, FBI agents discovered that Mak was in the process of copying thousands of pages of technical documents onto computer disks, which he arranged to send to China using his brother and sister-in-law as couriers.

According to court documents, the Maks encrypted the disks to avoid detection and used coded words to arrange a drop-off of the disks to a Chinese intelligence operative. In one phone conversation, the brother, Tai Wang Mak, intimated that he would be traveling with his wife and a third companion he described as his "assistant" -- a reference, prosecutors said, to the disks, hidden in his luggage.

The plan was foiled on Oct. 28, 2005, when agents arrested Tai Wang Mak as he was preparing to board a plane at Los Angeles International Airport. Chi Mak and his wife were arrested at their home the same day.

A key piece of evidence was a to-do list of apparent intelligence targets, written in Chinese script. The note, which had been shredded, was retrieved from Chi Mak's garbage and painstakingly reassembled to reveal what prosecutors said were instructions from Beijing on the kinds of technology Mak should seek to acquire.

Mak, who testified in his defense at his six-week trial, denied he was a spy and said the information he copied was available from nonclassified sources on the Internet. Defense witnesses said that much, if not all, of the documents acquired by Mak were not officially classified, though transmitting them to China was prohibited under U.S. export laws. Mak's attorney, Ronald O. Kaye, said his client was a scapegoat for other U.S. intelligence failures and a "symbol of the government's cold war against the Chinese."

In another recent case, former Northrop Grumman scientist Noshir Gowadia, who helped build the B-2 bomber, was indicted last fall for allegedly sharing cruise missile data with the Chinese government during a half-dozen trips to China. He is scheduled to go on trial in October.

A defense lawyer for Gowadia did not return calls, but Gowadia's family in Hawaii has told local journalists that the charges stem from a misunderstanding.

Robert Clifton Burns, a Washington lawyer who specializes in export cases, said the Chinese acquisition of sophisticated U.S. technology "is fast coming out from under the radar" as authorities crack down on such shipments to foreign powers. But Burns, who closely tracks prosecutions in the area, said the government sometimes overstates the risks of exporting U.S. items.

"People who violate export laws should be thrown in jail, no question about it," Burns said. But he added that there are also people "who would be better addressed by . . . a civil result where they get a small fine."






TahoeBlue

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http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/9/29/25139.shtml

Clinton Gave China Chips for Nuclear War
Charles R. Smith
Wednesday, Oct. 1, 2003

Newly declassified documents show that President Bill Clinton personally approved the transfer to China of advanced space technology that can be used for nuclear combat.
The documents show that in 1996 Clinton approved the export of radiation hardened chip sets to China. The specialized chips are necessary for fighting a nuclear war.

"Waivers may be granted upon a national interest determination," states a Commerce Department document titled "U.S. Sanctions on China."

"The President has approved a series of satellite related waivers in recent months, most recently in November, 1996 for export of radiation hardened chip sets for a Chinese meteorological satellite," noted the Commerce Department documents.

These special computer chips are designed to function while being bombarded by intense radiation. Radiation hardened chips are considered critical for atomic warfare and are required by advanced nuclear tipped missiles.

Judicial Watch obtained the documents through the Freedom of Information Act, a Washington-based political watchdog group.

Several documents were withheld from release by the U.S. Commerce Department for commercial and personal privacy exemptions, but none of the documents were withheld for national security reasons. Judicial Watch is expected to appeal the withholdings.

Decade of Betrayal

U.S. intelligence sources stated that the newly released documents illustrate the extent to which the Clinton White House placed trade – and trade with China specifically – above national security.

"In all likelihood we will be glowing in the dark before we discover the true extent of the Clinton decade of betrayal," stated Rick Fisher, Asian Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy.

"If it was indeed intended for a new PRC weather satellite, then it is possible that it was used for their new polar orbit weather satellites. This is significant because the Chinese themselves acknowledge that their polar orbit weather satellites directly contribute to their long-range missile targeting capability. This becomes even more important for their new smaller but more accurate warheads, used on their new DF-31, DF-31A, DF-5 Mod2 and JL-2 missiles. If they encounter significant weather, warhead accuracy degrades, reducing their utility," stated Fisher.

"Inasmuch as similar U.S. military weather satellites perform the same missions, the Clinton Administration had to have known they were assisting a PLA strategic military capability," concluded Fisher.

In addition, the Chinese military is clearly interested in acquiring advanced radiation hardened computer chips for its strategic nuclear arsenal.

U.S. Chips for PRC Nukes

Currently, China has only liquid fueled, long-range missiles, and the majority of them are based inside underground silos. These long-range rockets are reported to be "bore-sighted" – meaning the underground silos are aimed directly at target cities inside the United States.

The Chinese army is now attempting to shift its strategic nuclear arsenal to a solid-fuel "launch on command" capability. These new missiles are rail- and road-mobile and require sophisticated electronic guidance systems to accurately strike their intended targets.

As part of this upgrade, the Chinese army is also modifying its nuclear warhead designs to arm new survivable missiles such as the DF-31 and JL-2. Chinese engineers are planning to equip these new missiles with MIRV technology, allowing each missile to carry multiple nuclear warheads.

Again, the U.S. radiation hardened computer chip technology is a logical addition to the reconfiguration and upgrade of Chinese nuclear weapons.

Stolen U.S. Chips

Another critical element of the Clinton-supplied waiver is the fact that it took place during an investigation of Chinese espionage into missing U.S. radiation hardened satellite chips.

In February 1996, a Chinese Long March rocket carrying a Loral Intelsat satellite failed and crashed on lift-off. The Loral Intelsat payload was badly damaged. The Chinese intended to launch the Loral satellite into deep space as they had been paid to do by Loral CEO Bernard Schwartz.
However, fate took a twisted path, and so did the Chinese rocket. The Long March rocket failed on launch and crashed into a nearby Chinese village, killing over 200 innocent civilians. The failure of the Long March allowed the U.S. to recover the sealed satellite guidance box, which revealed the control board of radiation-hardened chips was missing.
The missing board from the Loral Intelsat satellite is no mystery. It quickly became obvious that Chinese engineers removed the special electronics and kept the board for examination. The stolen Loral electronics consist of radiation hardened, encrypted telemetry chips, stored in a secure flight control box similar to those found on airliners. The NSA changed all U.S. satellite codes as a result of the stolen Loral chips, costing American taxpayers millions of dollars.

1996 Illegal Campaign Donations

Another factor involved in the November 1996 waiver issued by then-President Clinton is the fact that illegal money entered the U.S. elections from the Chinese army. The money was donated to the DNC from a variety of sources including convicted Chinagate figures John Huang, Charlie "Yah-Lin" Trie and Johnny Chung.
The 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign readily accepted much of the money from the Chinese army sources without question, and in some cases took these donations in cash. The allegations of Chinese espionage and illegal campaign donations were never investigated properly.

The successful effort by China to obtain U.S. microchip technology included espionage, sabotage and perhaps bribery. The red intelligence windfall freed the Chinese army to more accurately target American cities with atomic weapons using advanced U.S technology.
The legacy that President Clinton left for the 21st century is a modern Chinese army equipped for global nuclear war.


http://www.artistmarket.com/writers/piraino/clintonchina.htm
Chasing the Dragon: Clinton's China Policy

By: A. Scott Piraino

...

Clinton's trouble with China began before his re-election in 1996. To defeat the Republicans, the Democratic party needed a quick infusion of cash to pay for campaign ads. Clinton turned to his Chinese connection, old friends Johnny Chung, John Huang, and Charlie Trie. They headed a shadowy cast of characters that funneled millions of dollars into democratic campaign coffers

Bill Clinton took contributions he knew came from China, and played another angle as well. US companies wanted to sell China military technology, but the sales were prohibited by law. Economic sanctions for the Tiananmen square massacre and restrictions on technology exports prevented these companies from selling China the armaments they wanted.

In return for campaign contributions, the President shifted regulation of technology exports from the State Department to the free-wheeling Commerce department. The administration also relaxed export controls and allowed corporations to decide if their technology transfers were legal or not. When easing restrictions wasn't enough, Clinton signed waivers that simply circumvented the law. The President's waivers allowed the export of machine tools, defense electronics, and even a communications system for the Chinese Air Force.

Bernard Schwartz and Michael Armstrong, the CEOs of Loral and Hughes, each donated over one million dollars to Clinton's re-election campaign. These companies had an interest in seeing China develop reliable missiles to loft their satellites into orbit. Clinton arranged direct talks between Bernard Schwartz and a Chinese general to improve China's rocket technology. Michael Armstrong was made head of the Export Advisory Council. Both companies were allowed to upgrade the launching and guidance of China's missiles.

Clinton even involved the Department of Energy, caretaker of our nuclear weapons, in his fundraising schemes. In 1994 and '95 then Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary accompanied Johnny Chung, John Huang, Charlie Trie, and Bernard Schwartz on trade missions to China. Shortly afterward the DOE relaxed security at US weapons labs. Wen Ho Lee, an ethnic Chinese physicist assigned to Los Alamos, illegally transferred data on nuclear warheads to his private computer files.

In June of 1995, the CIA learned that China had stolen the crown jewels of our nuclear arsenal, including the neutron bomb and the W-88 miniaturized warhead. Later that year National Security Advisor Anthony Lake is briefed on the thefts. He is replaced on the Security Council by Sandy Berger, a former lobbyist for the Chinese government. In June of 1996, before Bill Clinton's re-election, the FBI opens a formal investigation into the theft of US nuclear weapon designs.

Proof of China's military intentions came in March of 1996, on the eve of Taiwan's first democratic elections. China used the threat of force to intimidate the island nation into electing a pro-Beijing candidate. Military maneuvers included bombing runs and launching ballistic missiles that impacted within twenty miles of Taiwan. When the US sent an aircraft carrier into the Taiwan Straits, a Chinese general threatened to "rain down nukes upon Los Angeles".

In 1997, news of the campaign finance scandal reached the press. Clinton claimed he was "appalled" to learn he had received illegal contributions from China. As the Justice Department began investigating, over one hundred suspects fled the country or refused to testify. Despite FBI recommendations and congressional protests, Janet Reno refused to appoint an independent counsel.

Then the press learned that China had stolen nuclear weapon designs from US research labs. The Clinton administration downplayed and even denied reports that any nuclear secrets were stolen, but this scandal was too big to ignore. Congress began a formal investigation by forming the Cox committee. The administration was forced to reveal the extent of China's nuclear espionage, but they insisted Clinton had no previous knowledge. Sandy Berger even swore under oath that the President was not told about nuclear thefts until 1998, three years after the fact.

The Cox Committee report was released early in 1999. It confirmed that China had stolen the neutron bomb design and the W-88 miniaturized warhead. The W-88 would allow China to field smaller, mobile missiles and carry multiple warheads on larger missiles. In addition, the Cox report proved that US companies illegally transferred "missile design information and know-how". Chief among the offenders were Loral And Hughes.

In the summer of 1999 the pro-independence leadership of Taiwan called for talks with China on a state-to-state basis. The enraged Chinese demanded Taiwan enter unification talks or face attack. A Communist Party approved newspaper published a plan to conquer Taiwan. It involved using neutron bombs against any Taiwanese resistance and a nuclear standoff with the US.

On October 1st 1999, the fiftieth anniversary of China's communist takeover, a new missile was paraded through the streets of Beijing. The DF-31 is a modern, mobile nuclear missile capable of hitting targets in the US. The rocket motor and guidance system were made possible by Loral and Hughes. The nuclear warhead is a copy of the W-88, stolen from the US.
As for Wen Ho Lee, he was a suspected Chinese spy for three years before being fired from his job at Los Alamos and arrested. Lee was charged with 59 counts of mishandling nuclear weapons data with intent to injure the United States. Rather than face a trail where nuclear secrets would be admitted as evidence, federal prosecutors accepted a plea bargain. Wen Ho Lee pleaded guilty to one count of mishandling nuclear weapons data and went home, after serving 278 days in jail.

After China's nuclear espionage, a campaign finance scandal, and two crises over Taiwan, Bill Clinton's China policy has been venal at best, treasonous at worst. He is responsible for China's rise as a militant, nuclear armed threat to the United States. China has grown from an agrarian backwater into the world's third largest economy on Clinton's watch. While or yearly trade deficits with China have risen to 70 billion dollars a year, they have been the world's fastest growing economy. China has become a colossus precisely because of our trade deficits.

With their new wealth, China has sought military parity with the United States. They have been aided by President Clinton and corporate America. US companies spent over 100 million dollars lobbying congress to pass the China Relations Act. Most of that money went to buy congressional votes with campaign donations.

A few American stockholders have profited immensely from modernizing China's armed forces. Still more US companies have built factories in China. These factories and plenty of cheap, docile labor earn huge profits for these investors. Protecting these profits is Clinton's China policy.

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http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10107323-83.html

November 24, 2008 5:12 PM PST
Report: U.S. vulnerable to Chinese cyber espionage
Posted by Elinor Mills

China is actively conducting cyber espionage as a warfare strategy and has targeted U.S. government and commercial computers, according to a new report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

"China's current cyber operations capability is so advanced, it can engage in forms of cyber warfare so sophisticated that the United States may be unable to counteract or even detect the efforts," according to the annual report (PDF) delivered to Congress on Thursday.  http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2008/annual_report_full_08.pdf

...

• China’s space architecture contributes to its military’s command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability. This increased capability
allows China to project its limited military power in the western
and southern Pacific Ocean and to place U.S. forces at risk sooner
in any conflict.
• Cyber space is a critical vulnerability of the U.S. government and
economy, since both depend heavily on the use of computers and
their connection to the Internet. The dependence on the Internet
makes computers and information stored on those computers vulnerable.
• China is likely to take advantage of the U.S. dependence on
cyber space for four significant reasons. First, the costs of cyber
operations are low in comparison with traditional espionage or
military activities. Second, determining the origin of cyber operations
and attributing them to the Chinese government or any
other operator is difficult. Therefore, the United States would be
hindered in responding conventionally to such an attack. Third,
cyber attacks can confuse the enemy. Fourth, there is an underdeveloped
legal framework to guide responses.
• China is aggressively pursuing cyber warfare capabilities that
may provide it with an asymmetric advantage against the United
States. In a conflict situation, this advantage would reduce current
U.S. conventional military dominance.


The report cites news articles and testimony from U.S. officials like Col. Gary McAlum, chief of staff for the U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations. It concludes that Chinese cyber attacks, authoritarian rule, and trade violations are impediments to U.S. economic and national security interests.

A spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry, Qin Gang, said the report was misleading, impeding cooperation between the U.S. and China, and "unworthy of rebuttal," according to an article published late Monday in Secure Computing Magazine.

China is targeting government and private computers in the U.S., including systems operated by the biggest U.S. defense contractors, according to the report, which cited news articles. In 2005, hackers from China nabbed NASA files on the propulsion system, solar panels, and fuel tanks, and an aviation mission planning system for Army helicopters and Army and Navy flight planning software were stolen from the Army Aviation and Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal in Alabama, the report said.

China can access an unclassified U.S. military network called the NIPRNet (Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network) and "views is as a significant Achilles' heel and as an important target of its asymmetric capability," according to the report. This "gives China the potential capability to delay or disrupt U.S. forces without physically engaging them--and in ways it lacks the capability to do conventionally."

The U.S. government also is at risk as a result of the global computer supply chain, the commission said. Computer components used by the U.S. and manufactured in China are "vulnerable to tampering by Chinese security services, such as implanting malicious code that could be remotely activated on command and place U.S. systems or the data they contain at risk of destruction or manipulation," the report said. Hundreds of counterfeit routers made in China were found in systems throughout the Defense Department, it said.

The Chinese government is training citizens in cyber operations at military academies, and tolerates, or even encourages, actions taken by an estimated 250 hacker groups there, the report said.

Chinese military officials believe the U.S. is doing cyber espionage against China, and believe that by striking first with a cyber attack they can plant misinformation and hide their tracks, according to the report.

U.S. officials and lawmakers have complained about specific incidences where they believed Chinese representatives breached their systems. This summer, two congressmen who have been longtime critics of China's human rights record accused China of compromising computers that had information related to political dissidents. In the spring, government sources told the Associated Press that they were looking into allegations that Chinese officials copied data from a laptop left unattended in China by the commerce secretary




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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF COMMISSIONER WILLIAM A. REINSCH :
This year’s Report represents continued improvement over previous years, despite the Commission’s determined effort to make its
text as soporific as possible. If one is looking for a cure for insomnia, here it is. Substantively, however, the Report continues its
slow march to responsibility.

The rhetoric of past years has been reduced, and most—but not all—inflammatory recommendations
have been omitted
. In short, the Report is maturing, ....

Who is WILLIAM A. REINSCH? (CFR member)  a total slime bag...

http://www.uscc.gov/about/commissioners/reinpg.php

William A. Reinsch was reappointed to the Commission by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid for a fifth term expiring December 31, 2009.

Update: Chairman William Reinsch was reappointed to the Commission by Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid for a term expiring December 31, 2011 and elected Chairman for the 2011 report cycle


Prior to joining the National Foreign Trade Council, Reinsch served as Under Secretary for Export Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. As head of the Bureau of Export Administration (subsequently renamed the Bureau of Industry and Security), he was charged with administering and enforcing the export control policies of the U.S. government, as well as its anti-boycott laws. In addition, the bureau is part of an interagency team helping Russia and other newly emerging nations develop effective export control systems and convert their defense industries to civilian production. Through its Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, the bureau is also responsible for monitoring and protecting the health of U.S. industries critical to our national security and defense industrial base and assisting in domestic defense conversion efforts. Major accomplishments during his tenure included: refocusing controls in light of economic globalization, most notably on high-performance computers, microprocessors, encryption, and other items; the first complete revision of the Export Administration regulations in over forty years; revising the interagency process for reviewing applications; and permitting electronic filing of applications over the Internet.


From 1991 through 1993, Commissioner Reinsch was a senior Legislative Assistant to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, responsible for the senator's work on trade, international economic policy, foreign affairs, and defense.

From 1977 to 1991, Commissioner Reinsch served on the staff of the late Senator John Heinz as Chief Legislative Assistant, focusing on foreign trade and competitiveness policy issues. During that period, Senator Heinz was either Chairman or ranking minority member of the Banking Committee's Subcommittee on International Finance. He was also a member of the International Trade Subcommittee of the Finance Committee. Commissioner Reinsch provided staff support for the Senator on both subcommittees, which included participation in five revisions of the Export Administration Act and work on four major trade bills. Prior to 1977, Commissioner Reinsch was a Legislative Assistant to Representatives Richard Ottinger and Gilbert Gude, acting Staff Director of the House Environmental Study Conference, and a teacher in Maryland.
...
Commissioner Reinsch received a B.A. degree in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University and an M.A. degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is married with two children and lives in Bethesda, Maryland.

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/transcripts/05_04_21_22.pdf

STATEMENT OF JOHN ZYSMAN, CO-DIRECTOR
BERKELEY ROUNDTABLE ON THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

We’re not going to stop China’s entry. We may shape the character of China’s entry, but we’re not going to stop it. And the great
question is the nature and character of our own adaptation, our own adjustment, our own successful response to the character of
the economic and security challenges that that poses.

The second point that I want to make is that the key issue is the nature of our adaptation and our adjustment. The third is that the
core of that is going to be an emphasis on innovation, not simply technical innovation, but in fact innovation in business models, innovations
in fundamental business strategies.

Now having said that let me run through these slides fairly quickly, and I’ll put, as you’ve asked the core points in the record.

The first, as I say, is that China’s not the latest story. Really the term ‘‘globalization,’’ if you actually count it really emerges with
Japan. We had a bilateral world. Bilderberg was the center of the universe until the Trilateral Commission emerged with the emergence
of Asia as a real challenge
. And Japan was really the first instance of that Asian challenge. In a certain sense globalization is
a sequence of national stories, told on a larger stage.

When I emphasize that China is not the only story I suspect that Motorola would pick a different national story as its big threat. It
might choose Finland. It might choose the character and strategy that the Finnish adopted that led them from being on the periphery
of the Soviet empire to a core player in the communications era.
 

http://www.softwar.net/399cv280.html

U.S. SUPER-COMPUTERS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH
7. According to Federal Code USC title 18, sections 203 through 208, with regard to conflict of interest, White House advisors are prohibited from working on matters in which they have a direct financial interest. This law also prohibits them from lobbying on matters they worked on while in government and prohibits them from lobbying for a period of one year after they have left service. For example, a 1995 secret meeting in the White House attended by Podesta Associates employee, Ken Kay, took place while John Podesta was employed at the White House. In addition, John Podesta left the employ of the White House and went directly to work for his brother, Tony Podesta, in July 1995. Please see example #14 - June 1995 letter from William Reinsch Dept. of Commerce, C. Boyden Gray letter, CSPP letter and White House letter.

13. According to the 6/1/95 memo from William Reinsch to Ron Brown - please see example #20, the CSPP meeting included Podesta Associate employee Ken Kay, and Charles Levy, a representative of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering (C. Boyden Gray). According to C. Boyden Gray of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering - the CSPP did not "engage" the Commerce Dept. on the issues covered in the 6/1/95 memo until November of 1995. In addition, CSPP Director Ken Kay donated money to the DNC and even obtained a "painting" of unknown value from the DNC. Please see example #21 3/11/98 letter from C. Boyden Gray.

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Who is WILLIAM A. REINSCH?

http://news.muckety.com/2011/03/08/bill-reinsch-lobbyist-activist-and-federal-appointee/30971


http://www.uscc.gov/about/commissioners/reinpg.php

William A. Reinsch was reappointed to the Commission by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid for a fifth term expiring December 31, 2009.
Prior to joining the National Foreign Trade Council, Reinsch served as Under Secretary for Export Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. ... Chairman William Reinsch was reappointed to the Commission by Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid for a term expiring December 31, 2011 and elected Chairman for the 2011 report cycle.

From 1991 through 1993, Commissioner Reinsch was a senior Legislative Assistant to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, responsible for the senator's work on trade, international economic policy, foreign affairs, and defense.

Update:

Chairman William Reinsch was reappointed to the Commission by Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid for a term expiring December 31, 2011 and elected Chairman for the 2011 report cycle

http://hardastarboard.mu.nu/?cat=64

William Reinsch, formerly a Clinton Administration hatchetman Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, was an individual whose major asset to that misbegotten socialist regime was the willingness to commit President Clinton’s treason by proxy. Reinsch (spit! No better than a Frenchman!), came away from the corrupt leftist quagmire of the Clinton Administration with a highly respected profession in the treason industry.
http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/gaffney042407.php3

Reinsch had a checkered career prior to assuming his current role as Terror’s Lobbyist. For example, during the Clinton Administration, he used his senior position in the Commerce Department to facilitate and excuse China’s acquisition of an array of sensitive and even dual-use technologies, despite restrictions on such transfers.

Now, the former Commerce Under Secretary heads a trade council that favors doing business with America’s enemies and runs interference for those determined to do so. In his present role, Reinsch is working to counter citizens and their elected representatives who believe such business dealings are strategically ill-advised and morally repugnant.

Specifically, Reinsch’s trade association is mobilizing its considerable resources to help public pension fund managers, their Wall Street advisors and state treasurers fight off initiatives like one adopted last year by Illinois. It put an end to investments on the part of that state’s firefighters, police officers, National Guard personnel and other public employees in companies doing business with the Islamofascist and genocidal regime in Sudan.

Not too many decades ago, a scumbag like William Reinsch would have been publicly branded the traitor he was and dealt with accordingly. Today, well…

An August, 2006 article by Charles R. Smith serves as a reminder of Reinsch’s officially sanctioned yet criminal activities under Clinton. {Scroll down to Clinton’s Chinagate Scandal, though the entire link is profoundly well worth reading} http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/8/28/92737.shtml


It should come as no surprise that the NFTC {my note, National Foreign Trade Council} is headed by Clinton-era former Under Secretary for Export Administration, William Reinsch. Reinsch claims, in his NFTC bio, that he “administered and enforced the export control policies and anti-boycott laws of the U.S. government and monitored the condition of the nation’s defense industrial base.”
Reinsch may claim to have “administered and enforced,” but his record from the Clinton years shows that little of either was in place at his office. During his term at the Department of Commerce, Reinsch oversaw the greatest military technology transfer to the Chinese army in U.S. history.

The Chinese army managed to obtain, steal, or buy supercomputers for nuclear weapons research, missile warhead guidance systems, missile nose-cone software, radiation-hardened chip technology, encrypted satellite communications, and Synthetic Aperture Radar systems.
The list of advanced military technology that passed through Reinsch on its way to Beijing is too long for this article. It would not surprise me to find that Bill Reinsch has several awards waiting for him if he should ever visit PLA headquarters.

Suffice to say that the NFTC could not have selected a more qualified individual if it is their intent to transfer whatever technology – military or otherwise – to China for hard, cold cash.
I once confronted Reinsch after a congressional hearing on secure communications. During that meeting, he denied that he had anything to do with the export of advanced encryption satellite technology to the Chinese military. At that point, I presented him with copies of documents showing that he was not only a major player; he also authorized the sale of precisely that technology directly to Chinese military-owned companies.

In any of the countries Reinsch supports more than he does the United States, a citizen like him would likely have been brought before some general or other whose only comment would have been, “Tek heem out and shoot heem!”

by Seth @ 5:04 am. Filed under Traitors To America,


http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/8/28/92737.shtml

Deadly Dealings: Missiles From China to Hezbollah
Charles R. Smith
Monday, Aug. 28, 2006

The Israeli war against Hezbollah (round one) brought with it the realization at the highest levels that dangerous weapons were floating around in dangerous hands. The successful attacks against a cargo vessel by Hezbollah, using Chinese-made C-802 cruise missiles, raised alarm bells all over the globe.

Immediately after the attack, the first alarm bell rang at CIA headquarters, where an intensified global intelligence operation to track weapons deliveries was started. The CIA began to track Iranian efforts to resupply Hezbollah with more Chinese-made C-802 missiles.

According to reports, the CIA discovered that an Iranian Il-76 cargo plane, loaded with another Chinese-made missile launcher and up to eight C-802 missiles, was being prepared to fly to Syria. The weapons on board were for Hezbollah. Officially, the Iranian cargo plane was carrying medical and other non-military aid to help innocent victims of war inside Lebanon.

....
Clinton Chinagate Scandal


It should come as no surprise that the NFTC is headed by Clinton-era former Under Secretary for Export Administration, William Reinsch. Reinsch claims, in his NFTC bio, that he "administered and enforced the export control policies and anti-boycott laws of the U.S. government and monitored the condition of the nation's defense industrial base."


Reinsch may claim to have "administered and enforced," but his record from the Clinton years shows that little of either was in place at his office. During his term at the Department of Commerce, Reinsch oversaw the greatest military technology transfer to the Chinese army in U.S. history.


The Chinese army managed to obtain, steal, or buy supercomputers for nuclear weapons research, missile warhead guidance systems, missile nose-cone software, radiation-hardened chip technology, encrypted satellite communications, and Synthetic Aperture Radar systems.

The list of advanced military technology that passed through Reinsch on its way to Beijing is too long for this article. It would not surprise me to find that Bill Reinsch has several awards waiting for him if he should ever visit PLA headquarters.


Suffice to say that the NFTC could not have selected a more qualified individual if it is their intent to transfer whatever technology – military or otherwise – to China for hard, cold cash.


I once confronted Reinsch after a congressional hearing on secure communications. During that meeting, he denied that he had anything to do with the export of advanced encryption satellite technology to the Chinese military. At that point, I presented him with copies of documents showing that he was not only a major player; he also authorized the sale of precisely that technology directly to Chinese military-owned companies.

Reinsch turned very pale and literally ran from the room. Since then he has refused to answer any of my questions and failed to return any calls.




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http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0401/p99s01-duts.html

By Simon Montlake
from the April 2, 2008 edition

Former Pentagon official pleads guilty in China spy case
The case involves classified Taiwan weapons data and follows admissions about an errant shipment of nuclear fuses to Taiwan

A former Pentagon official pleaded guilty in court Monday to an espionage charge over the disclosure of secret data to an alleged Chinese agent in the US. Gregg Bergersen said he was unaware that the Taiwan-born businessman was passing the information to China. Mr. Bergersen, a weapons systems policy analyst who resigned his job last week, could face up to 10 years in prison.

The leaked data concerned US weapons programs for Taiwan, which China has threatened to regain by force, if necessary. Taiwan is a potential flash point for US-China rivalry in East Asia, and US military support for Taiwan is an irritant to Beijing. In turn, Taiwan has flagged China's steady buildup of missiles capable of hitting Taiwan. US military officials have warned that China and Russia have stepped up military spying activities in recent years, focusing on advanced weapon technology.

Last week, US officials anxiously contacted China after the Pentagon revealed that it had sent nuclear fuses to Taiwan by mistake in 2006, an embarrassing admission that raised eyebrows over US safeguards on nuclear-related technology, reports the Los Angeles Times. The admission sent mixed signals about US-Taiwan relations.
...
In two separate developments this week, a judge in California agreed to postpone until next May the trial of a Chinese-American engineer charged with stealing military and aerospace trade secrets on behalf of China, the Associated Press reports, and a federal court sentenced a Chinese-born engineer working on a Navy warship to 24 years in jail for trying to pass "sensitive data" to China, Bloomberg reports.

In Monday's trial, the Washington Post reports that Tai Shen Kuo, the alleged Chinese agent, plied Bergersen with money and gifts, including money for gambling, though a judge said that money might not have been the prime motivation. A prosecutor told the district court in Alexandria, Va. that Mr. Kuo had cultivated Bergersen as a source of information, without explicitly agreeing to buy data from him.
Sources familiar with the case said Bergersen wanted to leave the Defense Department and start a defense contracting business with Kuo….

The material that Bergersen gave Kuo, according to court documents, included all projected US military sales to Taiwan for the next five years and details of Po Sheng, a Taiwanese communications system that collects and transmits information for the armed forces.

The Associated Press reports that Taiwanese military officials have said that Bergersen's disclosures were damaging but hadn't compromised key defense technology. Bergersen pleaded guilty Monday to conspiring to pass national defense information to unauthorized persons. Prosecutors have also charged Kuo and another defendant, Chinese national Yu Xin Kang, with more serious counts of espionage that carry potential life sentences. Both are in jail awaiting trial.

Kuo, 58, is a naturalized US citizen and a native of Taiwan… Prosecutors allege that Kang, 33, served as the go-between for Kuo and the People's Republic of China.

The Chinese government has called the espionage accusations groundless and accused the US of "Cold War thinking."

US government agents tracked Bergersen and Kuo to several locations between March 2007 and their arrest in February, reports the Times-Picayune. At one meeting, Kuo stuffed $3,000 into Bergersen's shirt pocket and in return was given the data on weapons sales to Taiwan. The documents "had jagged marks where Bergersen had snipped off the 'classified' markings."

The espionage trial comes on the heels of last week's revelation by the Defense Department that it had mistakenly shipped nuclear warhead fuses to Taiwan. Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered an investigation into the error, and Pentagon officials said that China had been informed in advance of the announcement, reported Al Jazeera. Officials said the apparent mix-up in 2006 didn't mean any change in US policy towards Taiwan.

President Bush repeated this message to Chinese President Hu Jintao during a phone call last week, reported The Associated Press. National security advisor Stephen Hadley told reporters that the issue was briefly discussed and that Bush told Hu "that a mistake had been made."

Last year, the US Air Force revealed that a B-52 bomber carrying nuclear cruise missiles flew over the US by mistake. This apparent carelessness belies the US government's diplomatic efforts to halt nuclear proliferation and its criticism of Russia for not securing its own weapons stockpile, reports The New York Times.

By losing control of the four missile nose-cone fuses that fit atop a nuclear warhead, the United States risks significant diplomatic criticism from China, which has complained about American weapons sales to Taiwan, an island that Beijing considers a renegade province.

Update on Mak....
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aMq9uSnxYdXI&refer=us

Chi Mak was the lead engineer on a project to develop quieter motors for U.S. Navy warships at an L-3 Communications Holdings Inc. unit in Southern California. He was arrested in October 2005 with his wife, brother and brother's wife.



TahoeBlue

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http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1213993&pageid=0

Indian infotech sector is main focus of Chinese spying
Monday, December 15, 2008
Josy Joseph

Bangalore: BANGALORE: A few months ago, a major Bangalore-based infotech company lost out on a $8 million contract. The company was expecting a business delegation to visit India before signing the contract, but 15 days before the date set for the deal, the meeting was abruptly called off.

The same team went to China instead. When the Indian firm investigated the matter, it discovered a gaping hole in its security. The computers of several of its top executives had been compromised by Chinese hackers and privileged information leaked to a Chinese competitor, who walked away with the deal by quoting a lesser price.

Welcome to war of another kind - corporate espionage. Chinese companies are increasingly spying on the Indian IT industry, the only major business area where India leads the Chinese by several years. With many companies reportedly becoming victims of Chinese espionage, Indian intelligence officers are beginning to take a close, hard look at the influx of Chinese nationals into Bangalore, India's IT hub.

The Chinese presence in the Bangalore-Mysore belt largely comprises students in Mysore University. Besides, there are several Chinese citizens who are training or working at Indian IT firms.

Intelligence officers are probing whether the sudden surge of Chinese interest in
Bangalore and Mysore is part of a larger game plan to steal India's IT advantage through massive industrial espionage. The main aim, obviously, is to replicate Indian IT's successes in mainland China, grab major contracts, and gain the upper hand in a hostile future competitive scenario.

Investigators are tight-lipped on the progress of their inquiry. But a source says they are looking at parallels between the presence of Chinese nationals in Karnataka and what has been reported about Chinese espionage in industrial complexes around the world.

Across Europe, Australia, and US, many espionage cases involving the Chinese have been reported at industrial clusters and cutting-edge firms. In most of these cases, investigations have revealed the key role played by Chinese students and workers in obtaining information for firms and institutions back home.

Recent instances of Chinese hacker attacks on major Indian IT companies only serve to illustrate the seriousness of the threat. The top brass of one IT firm were unnerved when they landed in China and discovered that their hosts knew everything about their plans. The Chinese knew what their proposed branch intended to do, what salaries would be offered to locals, the number of jobs on offer, et al. "The Indian officials were surprised and came back to carry out a security audit," said the source. "They found that their computers had been compromised for a long time."

Investigators suspect the Chinese are probably using their traditional network of students, workers, and tourists to extract sensitive information and gain access to any next-generation technology that Bangalore firms may be working on. "It may have started with Huawei Telecom, but today many Chinese firms have a presence in Bangalore," said security analyst Rahul Bhonsle, an ex-army officer who, way back in 2000, wrote about the threat to the IT sector from China. "Some of them are definitely fronts for intelligence operations."

Over the past two years, the government has rejected several of Huawei's proposals, including a deal with MTNL, citing security concerns. In 2006, a high-powered government committee had recommended that no Chinese investment be allowed in critical sectors.

"In tomorrow's asymmetric information warfare scenario, it [a critical presence in India's IT sector] would give them a great advantage," said Bhonsle. "Besides, it is possible for a sleeper to wreak havoc in, say, some banking software created by an Indian firm and deployed with an international banking major."

Investigators are also beginning to look at a significant number of joint ventures, collaborations and other work relations being built up between Indian IT firms and Chinese companies. "Many of them could be just a cover for industrial espionage," said a source involved in the investigation.



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Since we've leaked so much technology to China, i am wondering why their latest "Space Walk" was done in a pool, as the crystal clear bubbles begin flying out of "Astronaut's" Helmet as he is "working" on the "Space Craft"
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

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http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=6228552

Woman accused of spying for China at Motorola
Wednesday, June 25, 2008 | 10:55 PM

By Chuck Goudie(WLS) -- A Chinese spy was caught "red-handed," according to federal authorities, as she was about to board a plane at O'Hare bound for Beijing.
Hanjuan Jin says she worked as a computer engineer for Schaumburg-based Motorola, a global leader in communications technology.
Federal agents say Jin was also working as a spy for a Chinese company, and she has been charged in a corporate espionage case that reflects a growing national security problem.
She doesn't look much like the villainess in a James Bond film. But the FBI says 37-year-old Hanjuan Jin played the spy role in real life.

Jin, a Chinese-born American citizen and graduate of the Illinois Institute of Technology, had been working at Motorola headquarters in Schaumburg since 1998. She was a software engineer, living in a comfortable townhouse not far from her job.
Two years ago, according to a federal indictment handed up in April, Jin went on medical leave from Motorola.
Despite claiming to be deathly ill, investigators say, she traveled from Chicago to Beijing where she agreed to work for a Chinese tech company that allegedly recruited her to steal Motorola secrets."The federal government is saying basically that you're a corporate spy. What about that?" the I-Team's Chuck Goudie asked Jin.
"No, I'm not. I'm not. I'm not," she responded.
"You're not a spy?" Goudie asked.
"They made a mistake," Jin said.
According to the indictment, a Chinese executive told Jin, "You should share in the fruit of our collective effort," once she'd stolen top-secret Motorola files, schematics and military communication plans.
When Jin returned to Motorola from medical leave in February of 2007, authorities say, she did just that, downloading hundreds of confidential documents from the company's supposedly secure internal network, including documents related to public safety organizations in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.
Two days later, she arrived at O'Hare Airport with a one-way ticket to Beijing.
"What were you doing at O'Hare Airport with a one-way ticket to China?" Goudie asked.
"No, I go to visit my mom. My husband and my mom are China," she said.

Hanjuan Jin was just a few steps away from boarding a United 747 non-stop to China. It was only a routine check of passengers by customs agents that revealed she was carrying $30,000 in cash after declaring she had only $10,000.
"Why were you on a one-way ticket?" Goudie asked.
"Because I can buy it cheaper to China," Jin said.
"They say you're a spy," Goudie said.
"They say that, but it's not true. They make mistake. They're paranoid. They wrongly accuse me. I have fatal disease," Jin said.
"What is the fatal disease?" Goudie asked.
"I have TB and meningitis," Jin said.
"You have tuberculosis?" Goudie asked.
"I almost died," Jin responded.
During the search of Jin and her bags at O'Hare, federal agents say they found a laptop computer and more than 30 compact data storage devices containing stolen Motorola files.
Jin told Goudie the files had been given to her by a supervisor at Motorola to refresh her memory from the medical leave.
"He assigned me too much work. I couldn't do it," Jin said.
"So you were gonna take and do it in China?" Goudie asked.
"That's OK," Jin responded before getting into a car.
On its Web site, Motorola touts the company's internal security but declined an invitation from the I-Team to explain how an employee just off medical leave could nearly board a plane to Beijing with $600 million in corporate secrets. That is Motorola's own estimate quoted by the FBI.
In a brief, generic statement, Motorola cited its "extensive policies, procedures and training in place to protect the security and confidentiality of the Company's intellectual property."

Motorola isn't alone. This month, Illinois Senator Dick Durbin asked for an investigation of whether senate computers are among dozens of government devices hacked into by the Chinese. And national security agencies are now warning all Americans attending the Beijing Olympics this summer to leave cell phones and laptops at home because, they say, there is a 100 percent likelihood that Chinese agents will scan and steal the contents.
The FBI, apparently unimpressed by American corporate security, recently increased counterintelligence against Chinese infiltration of U.S. companies. FBI director Robert Mueller says he has "substantial concerns" that China is using scientists, students and "front companies" to steal U.S. military secrets, and that poses a threat to our national security.
In the past year, there have been at least a dozen criminal cases of Chinese espionage brought in the U.S.

TahoeBlue

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http://www2.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=ca90416e-fe77-4b8d-ae59-a4e9f55b6441&k=26688

Canadian Government vows to curb Chinese spying on Canada
Janice Tibbetts, CanWest News Service
Published: Sunday, April 16 2006
OTTAWA -- Canada's foreign affairs minister says he wants to crack down on Chinese spies who are stealing industrial and high-technology secrets at a tremendous cost to the economy.
"It's something that we want to signal we are prepared to address and continue to raise with the Chinese at the appropriate time," Peter MacKay told CTV.

MacKay raised concerns of the release earlier this month in China of the RedBerry, an imitation of Canada's BlackBerry handheld device, made by Research in Motion based in Waterloo, Ont.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has been investigating economic espionage involving China, although it does not name the country specifically in background and annual reports posted on its website.

"The damage to Canadian interests takes the form of lost contracts, jobs and markets and overall, a diminished competitive advantage," CSIS reported in a 2004 paper.

"Information and technology that has been the target of economic espionage includes trade and pricing information, investment strategy, contract details, supplier lists, planning documents, research and development data, technical drawings and computer databases."

Sectors considered sensitive and likely targets of foreign interest, CSIS says, include aerospace, biotechnology, chemicals, communications, information technology, mining, nuclear energy, oil and environmental technologies.

Foreign students and scientists, business delegations and Chinese immigrants are among those used as informants, says the spy agency.

"The most frequently used collection method is the recruitment of someone who has access to the information (employees, contractors, consultants, students, etc.). However, other methods include break-ins, briefcase tampering, photocopying, garbage retrieval and communications interception," the report says.

News reports last year said there are as many as 1,000 Chinese economic spies operating in Canada.

The Chinese Embassy in Ottawa has denied Beijing has spies in Canada

TahoeBlue

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Seven years to prosecute????

http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/11/22/real-life-chinese-spy-case-ends-in-silicon-valley/

November 22, 2008 | Real life Chinese spy case ends in Silicon Valley
By Michael W. Jones


The new James Bond film may be wowing audiences in theaters, but industrial espionage in Silicon valley is making headlines. Two Chinese nationals were sentenced to one year each in Federal prison on Friday. The sentencing hearing marked the end of a seven-year-old case involving the theft of chip designs from Valley manufacturers, destined for use by mainland China chip manufacturers.

According to the AP, the two were the first people convicted of the most serious crime under the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) of 1996. The first defendant was Fei Ye, a United States citizen. The second was Ming Zhong, who is a permanent resident of the United States. They were both accused, under the EEA, of attempting to provide economic benefit to China via the chip designs that they had stolen. The prosecutors in the case stopped short of alleging that the Chinese government was are of the activities of Ye and Zhong.

The two defendants were arrested in 2001 at the San Francisco International Airport, trying to board a flight to China with luggage containing sensitive design documents describing how to manufacture specific computer chips. The documents had been taken from four Silicon Valley manufacturers for whom the pair had worked. The firms from whom the secrets had been stolen were NEC Electronics Corp., Sun Microsystems Inc., Transmeta Corp. and Trident Microsystems Inc.

At the time of their arrest, Ye and Zhong were also carrying documents showing that they had been working with Chinese government agencies who would be providing funding for the Chinese start-up venture they were planning. The  Economic Espionage Act was used in the prosecution because the combination of evidence strongly suggested that the abilities of China in the area of chip manufacturing would have been substantially advanced by the information stolen by Ze and Zhong.

The two could have been sentenced to as much as 30 years each for the crimes, but prosecutors asked for the one-year sentences passed down because the two industrial spies had cooperated in the investigation of the charges.

leverForTruth

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MADE IN CHINA! INSTEAD IT SHOULD SAY MADE BY A SLAVE IN CHINA.

TahoeBlue

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Well with the naming of Leon Panetta as CIA director and Hillary CLinton as Sec. of State and the old Clinton Justice dept. crew in place, there is almost no doubt that Chinese espionage will now be emboldened once again... for your enjoyment Congressional record of the COSCO arms and Long Beach Naval shipyard sale to the the Chinese...

No one guarding the hen house now....


http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997_cr/h970415-cosco.htm

COSCO: A COMMUNIST CHINESE-OWNED COMPANY (House of Representatives - April 15, 1997)

[Page: H1534]
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Taylor of North Carolina). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 1997, the gentleman from California [Mr. Cunningham] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I do not plan to take the whole time. My colleagues just spoke on the issue of our generation and future generations on taxation, and as important as it is, I feel it is very important that we bring up another subject. That is the subjugation of the United States by a Communist-owned company, and control of.

What I would like to do tonight is talk on the facts. Those facts are based on when I served in the U.S. Navy, I served on 7th Fleet staff and was responsible for all Southeast Asia countries, the defense of, not only in the training exercises, but in the real world threat.

For example, in Team Spirit in Korea, we ran exercises involving our allies in the defense of Korea. That involved our reserves, that involved all of our friendly assets that we had to bear if North Korea came across a line. But at the same time, I had access to some 13 linguists that monitored North Korea's frequencies to give us an idea of real threats.

For example, my last year there, the two Mig 21's came over across the line and defected, and we were responsible for that as well. While at Navy Fighter Weapons School my job was to plan and coordinate not only offensive but defensive impacts and invasions of Southeast Asian countries, so I come tonight with experience and fact. I would like to give those tonight to the Speaker to make his decision, as I hope the American people do.

Cosco is a Communist-owned, Communist Chinese-owned company. Its purpose is ship containers in and out of major ports all over the world. Recently, California has been devastated by the President's defense cuts. We have lost over 1 million jobs. The additional BRACC cuts in base closings and realignments have cost thousands to millions of jobs in the State of California. The people of Long Beach have lost thousands of those jobs, as we did at Kelly Air Force Base, as we did at El Toro and Miramar, and the shifting of different assets.

In that process, the people of Long Beach are looking for help. They have mouths to feed just like anyone else. They have children to send to college. They have been devastated from these cuts in national security in base realignment and closures.

What I plan to show tonight is a direct link between the White House fundraising with China and assets that have gone in favor of Communist China that could pose as a national security threat to the United States. I have intelligence reports that state so. I have facts that also state so, and I would like to make that case this evening.

First, Mr. Speaker, let us look at Long Beach perspective. Again, people have been devastated. They are without jobs, and they need help.

Mr. Speaker, I would say that all of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that are opposed to a Chinese Communist company taking over Long Beach Naval Air Station would be more than willing to do everything we can to help Long Beach recover those jobs, but not to a Communist-controlled nation of the Chinese Republic.

Cosco's ships fly flags of the People's Republic of China. The port lease with Cosco will provide Cosco with its own terminal. Major imports from China to Long Beach include toys, sporting goods, footwear, apparel, electrical parts, and machinery.

But Mr. Speaker, that is not all. Last year, it was Cosco that delivered to the State of California 2,000 AK-47's. The company that builds the AK-47's, the company that negotiates the trade of AK-47's around the world, the company Cosco, all set up by the PRC, the People's Republic of China, owns. They do not report to department heads. Their CEO is Communist China, all owned and coordinated and controlled by Communist China. Yet, they delivered over 2,000 AK-47's into our country, with the intent of selling these arms to our inner cities to disrupt, to disrupt our inner cities, and disrupt our political environment within the United States of America.

At the same time, the Clinton White House accepted both Cosco and the gunrunners themselves in a White House coffee. I will later show the direct tie between the $366,000 that was conducted to the DNC by the White House recipients and Chinese investors to allow Cosco to gain this favored status.

Long Beach Naval Shipyard closed as a result, as I said, of the additional base closures and lots of jobs were lost. We have a long way to protect those. I would also like to point out that during the bid to reclaim Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the marines lost a bid for the site to a China Cosco firm, and I quote from the Washington Times:

Several officers in the Marine Corps have raised questions about why the Clinton administration favored turning over a military base in Long Beach, CA to the Chinese ocean shipping company, Cosco, over the protest of marine reserve battalion made homeless by the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Briefings on the firm fail to convince many of its members. The CIA, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Coast Guard reinforced the view that Cosco's strong link with the Chinese Government is a fatal flaw in its proposal to deliver the base to a company.

Mr. Speaker, there is a current report, an updated report from the FBI, that states that Cosco is currently actively involved in placing intelligence officers, spies, in all of their ports of call. That is a national security interest.

Cosco has enjoyed a 15-year access to Long Beach Naval Shipyard. I have no problems with that. My problem comes with Cosco taking over complete control of the 145 acres in which they will control access of

every ship there. Every cargo container that comes off there, they will place it. They will have control of who sees where that cargo goes, where it is stored, what time of night it goes out, and who receives it.

Mr. Speaker, if we give China that opportunity, we are going to see an increase of illegal aliens in which two Cosco ships forced, in the last Congress, two ships owned by Cosco shipped in illegal aliens, the Chinese, it was in the newspapers, along with the AK-47's. At the same time, you remember it was a Cosco ship that plowed into the port recently and nearly devastated the port in another U.S. facility.

We cannot discuss the actual details of that intelligence briefing as it would not be prudent and it was a classified briefing. But I want to mention that two of the representatives that represent, and I understand their needs, they represent the people that are looking for jobs, one of those individuals stated that, and I quote, `All intelligence agencies that briefed us have assured us that Cosco represents no threat to our national security.'

I want to tell you, Mr. Speaker, it is an untruth, the fact that the same intelligence briefers, the CIA, the National Security, the Coast Guard, have all stated that no such comment was ever made and ever intended. And as a matter of fact, they were very, very upset at the dear colleague press release.

Why? Because they stated that this is a policy issue for them to discuss, and they would never say that there is a national security interest, nor would they say that there is not.

So I would submit that is not the case and that after careful deliberation of experience that there is a national security interest.

Let me go through some of the facts. The national security of the United States is a responsibility of Congress and the President, not the city of Long Beach.

Cosco has been attendant at Long Beach since 1991. The proposed lease agreement would turn over 145 acres of port property and grant Cosco a much more significant presence at that port, which I have discussed.

Cosco ship, Empress Phoenix, had attempted to smuggle in some 2,000 AK-47's fully automatic assault weapons, the same kinds of weapons, Mr. Speaker, that were used in the bank holdup in Los Angeles that placed our law enforcement agents in great jeopardy, the same companies in port at which we recently found down off the border, M-2 fully automatic weapons going to Mexico to disrupt their elections which are going to take place over the next 90 days and cause anti-American, antireform legislators and affect the elections in Mexico City. That the Chinese regime is not steadily a U.S. ally.

On January 24, 1996, the New York Times reported warnings by the former Ambassador, Charles Freling, quoting a Chinese official that China would intimidate Taiwan because U.S. leaders would care more about Los Angeles than they would Taiwan.

When the U.S. fleet started to go through the straits, when communist China started shelling Taiwan and missile attacks, the Chinese responded as we started to enter our fleet that either we withdraw or the threat of nuclear warfare on the city of Los Angeles.

Now, let's take a look at a Communist-owned and controlled facility in Long Beach Naval Shipyard. Hutchinson Group, also owned by Communist China, recently purchased both ends of the Panama Canal. This would give the Chinese control of the Panama Canal, it would give them control of Long Beach Naval Shipyard, and all of the access to and from and who sees what and where it goes. We feel that this would be a major national security threat.

Mr. Speaker, let us take a look at why economically China would want to do this. There is a study coming out by the military. China's number one import from the United States is wheat.

Why, Mr. Speaker, does not China or other cargo-containing vessels go around the horn instead of using the Panama Canal? Primarily, it has affected seagoers for centuries, the weather is bad and the threat of lost ships.

If they own both ends of the Panama Canal, the major export of wheat out of the United States to China is controlled through Long Beach Naval Shipyard, they could control economically price fixing of all of our exports going out of our major port at Long Beach. And we feel that this is also an economy threat as well as a military security threat.

According to the New York Times, Chinese officials had conveyed an ominous message to Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser, just weeks earlier: `The possibility that American interference in Beijing efforts to bring Taipei to heel could result in devastating attack on Los Angeles.'


[Page: H1535]

[TIME: 2245]

San Diego Union Tribune, March 31, 1996.

Panama Canal, one of the most strategic locations on the globe, has been brought under COSCO's web. Hutchinson Port Holdings Incorporated, a Hong Kong operated, controlled, again by a corporation, by Chinese Communists with direct ties to the Pacific and Atlantic entrances to the Panama Canal and global, syndicated columnist, Georgie Anne Geyer, Universal Press Syndicate, March 26, 1997.

At the same time, Mr. Speaker, we lost the Panama Canal, both ends of it, to Communist China owned companies. We had an American company from Alabama that bid on those same sites. They won the contracts for both of those sites. It was selected by Panama. After selection, after announcement, the Chinese government went in with sacks of cash, much like they did with our government here in the United States, and said, here is $25,000 for you, here is another $25,000 for you. And guess what? That decision was reversed and it went to Chinese Communists instead of a U.S. based firm. Johnny Chung, a Chinese American businessman from California, gave $366,000 to the Democrats, the DNC, that was later returned on suspicion it illegally came from foreign sources. Chung brought 6 Chinese officials to the White House last year to watch President Clinton make his weekly radio address. One of the 6 was the advisor from COSCO who was later given by the President access to Long Beach shipyard and also the actual gun runners that were there in the White House gave money to the DNC.

The chairman of one of these two Chinese arms companies implicated in the scheme to smuggle the 2,000 illegal Chinese-made weapons into Oakland aboard COSCO's ship had coffee in the White House in an affair associated with D.C. fundraising. Officials of the weapons company were indicted for shipping those arms.

I would reiterate, Mr. Speaker, the company that shipped it, the company that made the rifles, the company that were the arms dealers are all owned by a CEO called Communist China. So what if we turn over a port to COSCO, complete control of a Communist Chinese operated state. We will have illegal immigrants come into the United States. We will have an increase of drugs come into the United States. We will have an increase of Chinese intelligence officers within the United States on our borders, and it could prove a devastating national security issue.

On the campaign trail last year and in a White House meeting in 1995, President Clinton endorsed the proposal to transfer land of the Long Beach Naval shipyard to COSCO, but it was this March, 1995, the White House radio address that had critics talking. A COSCO advisor was among the Chinese businessmen invited to hear the President in the oval office just two days after a California businessman, Johnny Chung, made a $50,000 donation to the DNC and hand-delivered it to Mrs. Clinton's chief of staff Margaret Williams, CBS Evening News, March 11, 1997.

Shortly after the Long Beach Naval shipyard land transfer was arranged, the Clinton administration helped arrange, listen to this, Mr. Speaker, in the President's budget that he submitted, he gave free, no strings, gave to Communist China $50 million to burn a coal burning plant, after these meetings and after these DNC fund-raisers from the Chinese. He can cut impact aid for education, but he can also give $50 million to Communist China in the name of trade and just give it. That is not fair trade.

He also gave a multimillion dollar loan to build 5 Communist Chinese ships, COSCO ships, in a nonrecourse loan. What that means, Mr. Speaker, this is a loan of some $137 million, which may not be much to many Members around this body, but you ask the American people, $137 million of their taxpayers' dollars back up a nonrecourse loan to Communist China, a state-controlled company by Communist China, and if they forfeit, who is left holding the bag? The United States taxpayers. Our own ship builders do not have access to this type of loan, Mr. Speaker. Incredible. But yet the administration gives Communist China.

Over the past year a COSCO ship plowed into New Orleans boardwalk injuring 116 people and 6 COSCO ships were denied or detailed for violating international safety regulations by our Coast Guard. This is since January, COSCO has violated by the Coast Guard and had 6 violations since January and declared as an unsafe company, not only for plowing into the pier at New Orleans and devastating that pier, causing millions of dollars in injuries, but for the other violations as well.

COSCO was fined for paying kickbacks to shippers instead of abiding by tariffs. This is, again, a Chinese-operated company that was cited for giving kickbacks, payoffs for access.

We want to make it clear that we do not mean any ill will toward the people of Long Beach. As a matter of fact, we will do everything we can to restore the jobs that they lost in the BRACC closures and defense cuts. My colleagues on both sides of the aisle that are opposed to COSCO taking over this port will do that and do so vigorously.

COSCO's track record, if they were a company owned by some of our greatest allies, Great Britain or others, I would not want them in my backyard for the violations. But I would say this, if they want to stay as a tenant of Long Beach and not have total control and access of a former national security base, most of us would support that, Mr. Speaker.

Our problem, again, is giving them total access to a security base that controls entry of illegals, of drugs, of illegal arms and intelligence officers and could pose an economic and national security threat.


[Page: H1536]
Mr. Speaker, President Clinton took a personal role in promoting the interests of COSCO. At the same time he was cutting over 100 warships from the U.S. fleet, drawn up by the Bush administration, a 23 percent cut. The symbolism could not be anymore stark.

Richard Fisher, senior policy analyst with the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, noted the real security concerns of Long Beach Steel in a Washington Times column on April 13. His main point is given below.

If it so desires, the Chinese leadership can direct that COSCO assets be put at the disposal of the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, or the main espionage organ, the Ministry of State Security, the MSS. Do we really want a subsidiary of the People's Republic of China, a future superpower, to have such large presence at a port on our own coast, one of the only two West Coast ports with a dry dock large enough to repair our aircraft carriers?

Mr. Speaker, I would say that we do not. It is one of the reasons that the gentleman from California [Mr. Duncan Hunter] and I offered a bill to stop this takeover by a Communist power of U.S. territory.

The Clinton administration, and I would like to go through this step by step, it is not enough that there is a national security interest, but the Clinton administration and the China connection is very complicated. Unless you go step by step through it on how the various pieces seem to fit together, it is difficult to draw any special direction.

Webster Hubbell, John Huang, Johnny Chung, Charles Yah Lin Trie will be discussed. The other incidences of Roger Tamraz, a felon, Susan McDougal, White House and DNC Immigration and Naturalization Service, Arapaho Indian Tribe, Oklahoma fundraising--all of these I will not discuss, Mr. Speaker, because they do not have a direct tie, although indirectly, to the Chinese taking over a shipyard in Long Beach. I would like to go through and show how devastating the empirical indictment of a conflict of interest between the White House and Long Beach Naval Shipyard.

Let me first start with a family called the Riady family. The Riady family is based in Indonesia, controls a $12 billion financial empire operating under the umbrella of the Lippo Group. The family patriarch, one son, Stephen Riady has served as Lippo chairman since 1991. James Riady lived in Arkansas in the 1980's and there came to know then Governor Bill Clinton. The Riady family has an unusually big stake in maintaining most-favored-nation status for China since Lippo maintains enormous investments in Hong Kong, which is also the company that Mr. McDougal worked at.

The China connection. A Justice Department investigation into improper political fundraising activities has uncovered evidence that representatives of the People's Republic of China sought direct contributions from foreign sources to the DNC, the Democratic National Committee, before the 1996 Presidential election.

Mr. Speaker, our intelligence--the FBI and CIA--warned Janet Reno directly that China was attempting to influence the White House in policy decisions through campaign finance reports, much like they did in the port that we just talked about, by giving cash donations.

The Justice Department task force has discovered that in early 1995, Chinese representatives developed a plan to spend nearly $2 million to buy influence in Congress, this body, and the Clinton administration, and investigators are apparently trying to determine if any of that money was received by John Huang, Charlie Trie, among others. So the FBI has given us warning and the CIA that the Chinese are trying to influence our Government to make decisions in their favor. And then the Clinton administration gives them a $50 million coal burning plant, gives them a $127 to $137 million loan to build Chinese Communist ships. Then they give them access to Long Beach Naval Shipyard and complete control of it. We think that there is a direct problem.

John Huang, the Commerce Department and Lippo. John Huang, with no background check, with no background check, received top-level security clearance for work at the Commerce Department while still working for Lippo. This, despite Mr. Huang's ties to a Lippo bank that was ordered to cease and desist money laundering and despite Lippo commercial ties to China and its intelligence services, was granted access to top level intelligence services within the White House.

President Clinton attended a September 13, 1995, White House meeting with John Huang, James Riady of Lippo Bank, Bruce Lindsey, and C. Joseph Giroir, the lawyer who hired then-Governor Clinton's wife, Hillary Clinton, to the Rose Law Firm and who is now doing Riady business in China.


[TIME: 2300]

It was at that meeting that the transfer of Huang from the Department of Commerce to the DNC was arranged. A January 13, 1997, letter from the Commerce Secretary Mickey Kantor says that Mr. Huang got a weekly intelligence briefing centered on the People's Republic of China and the materials related to those briefings were under the control of the CIA. And again there was no security clearance whatsoever, although they were warned, the administration, that this man had ties to Communist China.

Senior White House aides learned that Commerce Department officials had concerns about John Huang in mid-1995, several months before the White House helped place him in a sensitive fund-raising job in the DNC, the Democratic National Committee. People at the Commerce Department itself described Mr. Huang as `bad news.'

According to several people familiar with the matter, officials at the Department were worried that Mr. Huang's government work posed a conflict with his past employment with Lippo and direct ties with Communist China.

In his second week on the job at the Commerce Department, Mr. Huang and Webster Hubbell, who has recently been in the news and who was then employed by Lippo, met for lunch in Washington. At the time, according to the internal White House documents, administration officials were monitoring Mr. Hubbell's cooperation with the Whitewater independent counsel. That evening, Mr. Huang joined Mr. Riady and Mr. Clinton at the President's birthday party.

It is no secret that these were some of the individuals that gave Mr. Hubbell over $500,000, quote, as a friend.

John Huang received 37 CIA-documented intelligence briefings at the Commerce Department, saw more than two dozen intelligence reports, and made over 70 phone calls to a Lippo-controlled bank in Los Angeles, his former employer.

Mr. Huang's message slips from the Commerce Department also showed calls from one Chinese Embassy official in February 1995 and three calls from the Embassy's commercial minister in June and August of that year.

Mr. Huang's desk calendar entries had three meetings scheduled with Chinese Government officials. He attended policy breakfasts at the Chinese Embassy in October 1995 and visited the Indonesian Embassy on October 11, 1995.

In March, President Clinton, after this meeting in Indonesia by Mr. Huang, in March 1996, President Clinton reversed a key administrative policy on immigration following a $1.1 million Asian fund-raising dinner, the most successful Asian-American political fund-raiser in United States history. Held the previous month and organized by, who else? John Huang, a former employee of Lippo.

President Clinton had previously opposed the practice of allowing foreign-born siblings of naturalized U.S. citizens to come to the United States, based on recommendations of a commission he appointed himself, and affirmed his desire to halt immigration in an early 1996 letter to the Speaker of the House.

But in March 1996, President Clinton made a last-minute about-face, after the Indonesian meeting with Mr. Huang and after the fund-raising of $1.1 million, and reversed his position and put top priority recommendations made in a strongly worded John Huang memorandum to Bill Clinton. And then, and now former, Senator Alan Simpson said: I never in 18 years in Congress, and I quote, saw an issue that shifted so fast and so hard.

After receiving $1.1 million from Indonesia, Mr. Huang began aggressively arguing for U.S. trade policy toward Vietnam only 1 day after joining the Commerce Department, and again with no security clearances whatsoever or background check, in July 1994, and pushed the idea for the next 17 months when Lippo Group sought to expand its investment empire into Vietnam itself. He also attended interagency meetings of an Indonesian working group. The next month, a United States trade mission to China resulted in a $1 billion power plant that Lippo would finance and benefit from. This is at the same time when the President agreed to give Communist China $50 million for a Chinese coal-burning plant.

In 1992, Candidate Clinton described as unconscionable Indonesia's treatment of the East Timorese, 200,000 of whom had perished since Indonesia had annexed East Timor 20 years ago. The administration even supported the United Nations resolution criticizing Indonesia's East Timor policy. Around the same time, Mark Grobymer, an Arkansas lawyer who golfs with Mr. Clinton, joined Mr. Huang and Mr. Riady on a trip to East Timor. In April the three men visited Mr. Clinton, and, guess what? The President reversed his position. Human rights activists claimed the administration's concern for Timor would be looked into.

John Huang helped raise $425,000 from an Indonesian couple whose primary bread earner was as a landscaper. When it was looked into, and that checks were made concurrently by the same source and it was brought up to the press, the DNC returned the money.

John H. K. Lee, of Cheong Am America, United States subsidiary of a South Korea company, gave $250,000 in illegal contributions to the DNC following a private meeting with President Clinton, and arranged by guess who? John Huang. The money was returned following a press story.

Mr. Speaker, what I am trying to show is that there was a direct link between fund-raising of foreign powers and the takeover of a national security base, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, by the Communist Chinese. And that if we allow this to happen, that in the interest of national security and economic security, that this administration has sold itself out to fund-raising interests from overseas.

On March 9, 1995, Margaret Williams, Chief of Staff to Hillary Clinton, accepted a $50,000 donation to the Democratic party from Johnny Chung, a California businessman who emerged as a central figure of the Justice Department and congressional investigations into Democratic fund-raising. Mr. Chung made a $50,000 donation to Democrats the same week as he escorted COSCO and also the gun runners that were there at the White House, a $50,000 donation to the DNC from these groups.

After that visit, President Clinton told his aides that he was not sure we want photos of him made with these people circulating around, end quote.

Mr. Chung told Mrs. Williams earlier in the administration that he wanted to give money to the Clintons personally, sought to exploit his contributions to excess commercial gain. Associates of Mr. Chung have said that he used his political access to submit business deals with investors from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, bringing them to the White House events for fund-raisers.

National security warnings ignored: Robert L. Suetting, a Chinese specialist on National Security Council, warned that Mr. Chung was quote a hustler who appeared to be involved in setting up some kind of

consulting operation that will thrive by bringing Chinese entrepreneurs into the town for exposure to high level United States officials, that is, COSCO.

Three months later Mr. Suetting expressed concern to Anthony Lake, who was at the time President Clinton's national security adviser, after the White House learned that Mr. Chung was leaving for China and planned to get involved in the sensitive case of imprisoned Chinese dissident Harry Wu.

Mr. Chung visited the White House 51 times, records show. Twenty-one of these times he was cleared for entry by the office of the First Lady. Mr. Chung made 17 visits to the White House after the April 1995 Committee on National Security memorandums identify him as a hustler and urged caution, and 8 visits after the second warning memorandum was sent to the NSC, Director Anthony Lake, in July 1995.

In March 1997, in her first extensive public remarks about the DNC fundraising controversy, the First Lady said she did not know why Johnny Chung had as much access and was spending so much time around her staff offices in the executive office building, but yet 21 of the 51 times it was the First Lady's office that granted direct access to Mr. Chung.

In March 1996, Charlie Trie, a Little Rock restaurateur and long-time friend of President Clinton, presented Michael H. Cardozo, executive director of the Presidential Legal Expense Trust, a defense fund set up for President Clinton and Mrs. Clinton to help pay their legal bills, with two manila envelopes containing checks and money orders for more than $450,000.

The fund returned about 70,000 immediately but deposited $378,300. Two months later, after the fund ordered an investigation, the rest of the money is returned. The investigation found that some of the money came from sequentially numbered money orders, supposedly from different people in different cities, and apparently signed in the same handwriting. And guess what? It was done by Mr. Trie and Mr. Huang again.

According to a defense fund trustee, Harold Ickes and Hillary Clinton had knowledge of the corrupt money and did nothing to stop the flow of it until newspaper columns and stories triggered Ickes' tip-off to the DNC that maybe Trie's fundraising would be linked to John Huang and James Riady and, yes, Mr. McDougal.

A Justice Department FBI task force investigating allegations that China may have directed contributions to the DNC, charges that the Chinese Government denies, is focusing on a series of substantial wire transfers in 1995-96 from a bank operated by the Chinese Government. The transfer, made from the New York office of the Bank of China, and usually made in increments of $50,000 and $100,000, came at a time when Mr. Trie was directing large donations, again to the DNC.

The Democratic National Committee has returned $187,000 that Mr. Trie personally contributed and plans to return another $458,000 he helped raise from others. The DNC said the donations appear to have foreign sources, which would make them illegal, and they returned them.

Some of the donors invited to the White House who participated in events with the President include: Mr. Russ Barakat, a south Florida Democrat party official who, 5 days after attending a White House coffee session in April 1995, was indicted on criminal charges and ultimately convicted of tax evasion.

A Florida newspaper was full of the stories about Mr. Barakat's problems with the law before the executive mansion get-together.

Mr. Wang Jun a Chinese businessman and the head of a military-owned arms company, while a part of the United States Government, was out investigating Wang Jun for allegedly smuggling in arms to this country, that is, 2,000 AK-47's. He was with Mr. Clinton at a White House coffee courtesy of Charlie Trie.

I will not speak about Eric Wynn because there is no tie.

Chong Lo, convicted of tax evasion in 1980 under the name of Esther Chu, who was another visitor at the coffee of the White House Clintons, has since been arrested again on 14 charges of falsifying mortgage applications, to which she had pleaded not guilty at the time.

In March 1997, Mr. Speaker, former White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta acknowledged that the 1996 Clinton reelection committee played a role in the spending of some $35 million to $40 million in soft money contributions on campaign commercials. Mr. Panetta's comments marked the first time that a member of Mr. Clinton's inner circle publicly stated that the President's reelection campaign helped direct the spending of these funds.

[Page: H1538]

[TIME: 2315]

When asked if it was illegal for the Clinton campaign to use soft money, Mr. Panetta replied it was not because the money was spent as a part of overall Democratic strategy in confronting the Republican Congress.

The key witnesses in the Democratic fundraising probe, Webster Hubbell, John Huang, and former White House aide Mark Middleton have reportedly invoked their fifth amendment rights and refused to turn over subpoenaed papers to the White House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, although in recent developments in the news, Mr. Hubbell has been forthcoming.

The Democratic National Committee has said it will return $3 million in illegal, improper or suspicious donations including $1.6 million raised by Mr. Huang, $645,000 raised by Charlie Trie and $366,000 raised by Johnny Chung.

What I would say, Mr. Speaker, is we need to take a look. Is there a conflict of interest between payments to the DNC, to the White House, and to the takeover of a Communist-controlled COSCO in Long Beach Naval Shipyard, a company again that shipped in AK-47's, a company that is owned by Communist China. Another company that actually made the arms, owned by Communist China. Another company that directs the sales of those and delivery of those arms owned by Communist China. All three corporations, their CEO is Communist China. And what future developments could we have by Communist China completely controlling and having access to Long Beach Naval Shipyard?

Again if they want to have a right to port there like they have over the 15 years, we have no problem with that. Our problem is it gives them complete control of the 145 acres and access, and where things go.

Mr. Speaker, we are opposed to the takeover of Long Beach Shipyard by a Communist Chinese power. Recently Communist China has increased its military spending by over 30 percent in one year. They recently purchased 250 SU-27's which outclass, nonparity, our F-15 Strike Eagles and our F-14-D's. Their AA-10, AA-11 and 12 missiles that they bought from Russia outclass our AMRAAM to where we do not have parity, even with those fighters.

Russia has currently a follow-on to that, the SU-35. Communist China and COSCO have illegally shipped nuclear weapons to all of our former enemies, including Iraq, Iran, and Syria. They have been cited for shipping chemical and biological weapons to Iran, Iraq, and Syria. That, with the threat to the United States that if we got involved with one of their holdings, Taiwan, that they would threaten us with nuclear retaliation on the city of Los Angeles, is that a country that we want to have control and access to our port? I say no, Mr. Speaker.

I believe in China, and I believe in trade, that it is hard to change a 10,000-year-old dog, and I think we need to get involved in investment with China. But currently we have one of the largest deficits, trading deficits with any other Nation with China. When we talk about trade, we need to talk about fair trade. We do not want access of Chinese-controlled government, we do not want them to slap us in the face with the threat of Taiwan. I think under Republican and Democratic administrations, Mr. Speaker, that our weak link is our State Department. I think our new successor in that department is probably the absolute best person we could have. She is tough, she is tough on negotiations, and I think she will stand up for our workers' rights over trade with China. But it has not happened in the past. And Madeleine Albright, I think if anybody can do it in the administration, she can, and I support that, because she is tough and that is what we need for a change in our trade negotiations. I supported NAFTA and I supported GATT, but yet our administration now and under Republican administrations in many of my colleagues' opinion has not stood up for our workers. Yes, we do need to trade with China. We do need to trade with other countries. But not when they keep slapping us in the face, and currently and in the future pose a national security threat to this country.

Mr. Speaker, all these facts are documented in newspaper articles.

END

leverForTruth

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We are already loosing all our jobs to them!

TahoeBlue

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We are already loosing all our jobs to them!

She's just doing what she's been paid to do....

Hillary replaces Mao

leverForTruth

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China has MAD technology!

TahoeBlue

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The old Long Beach Naval port is back in the news again... with little rays of sanity....

http://www.gsnmagazine.com/cms/features/news-analysis/1471.html
Port of Los Angeles prepares to cancel its controversial Chinese X-ray contract
By Jacob Goodwin, Editor-in-Chief
Published February 3rd, 2009

Nearly seven months after taking delivery of a mobile X-ray system manufactured in the People's Republic of China, the Port of Los Angeles is on the verge of canceling the controversial contract.

The staff at the port has recommended that the Board of Harbor Commissioners find DULY Research, Inc., the California-based broker who represents the Chinese manufacturer, in default of the terms of the contract, when it next meets on Feb. 5.

"Cancellation of the purchase contract is recommended because after delivery of the mobile scanning unit to the Port of Los Angeles on July 8, 2008, field tests and other research revealed that the manufacturer and vendor failed to meet the requirements of the Purchase Contract," said a staff summary submitted to the board.

The contract created a stir in the media and on Capitol Hill because the manufacturer is Nuctech Company Limited, a Chinese company headquartered in Beijing, whose president happens to be the son of the President of the People's Republic of China.

Critics of the deal argued that procuring a Chinese-built X-ray scanning system could endanger U.S. national security, that it would outsource U.S. manufacturing jobs, and that it was possible that Nuctech had "reverse engineered" patented U.S. and European X-ray technologies. The fact that a large portion of the purchase price would be reimbursed with a port security grant from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security drew additional criticism.
The contract was originally signed between the Port of Los Angeles and DULY Research, of Rancho Palos Verdes, CA, on October 24, 2007, for a total price of $1,880,000, said the memo prepared by the port's homeland security division. Since that time, the Board agreed to certain "add-on" options – that were not described in the staff memo -- that raised the total cost of the deal to more than $2.4 million.

In recommending that the board declare DULY Research in default and cancel the entire contract, the homeland security division made no mention of any of the political controversy that swirled around the original contract.

The fact that the port had signed such a contract to purchase a Chinese-built X-ray system was first disclosed in a front-page article published in the October 2008 edition of GSN: Government Security News. Shortly thereafter, Lou Dobbs, a TV newsman on the CNN; Michael Savage, a conservative radio talk show host; and Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA), whose congressional district includes the Port of Los Angeles, all blasted the port's X-ray contract.
On Jan. 23, perhaps jumping the gun, Lou Dobbs reported that "the port of Los Angeles has apparently come to its senses on a very important issue."

The next day, in anticipation of the board's vote, Rep. Rohrabacher welcomed the Harbor Commissioners' upcoming move. "The decision to cancel this contract was the right decision and I would hope moving forward, the Ports are given direction by the federal government not to just accept the lowest bidder," said the congressman.

In fact, the board has not yet taken any official action to cancel the Chinese X-ray contract.

According to the staff memo, DULY Research and Nuctech have fallen short of the terms of their contract in several ways:

• The mobile scanning vehicle cannot be lawfully imported into the U.S. as a "conforming motor vehicle" and is not capable of being driven legally in California;
• The unit does not meet European Union standards regarding the control of fluorinated greenhouse gasses;
• DULY Research has not provided evidence of compliance with ISO 9001 quality standards;
• DULY Research has not provided system documentation or operational checklists in the English language;
• The generator for the X-ray unit failed during training due to a faulty solenoid;
• Two different perimeter monitoring radiation dosimeters failed;
• DULY Research has not provided documentation certifying the calibration of the radiation detectors, and;
• "During testing, the Mobile Scanning Unit consistently failed to operate as specified without the intervention and assistance of a DULY Research/Nuctech technician."

The staff memo says that, if the board cancels the Chinese contract, "The Port Police will evaluate current technologies to determine how best to reprogram these funds."

David Yu, the president of DULY Research told GSN that the board is "thinking of cancelling the contract," but no final decision has been made yet.

"The result of your publication has generated a lot of negative feelings," he said on Feb. 3.

Yu and other members of the public will be granted three minutes each to address the board at its upcoming meeting. The president of the board has the right to offer Yu additional time.

TahoeBlue

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A great spy story... oh and a Wen Ho Lee - Los Alamos connection...

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22529-2004May12.html
Ex-Handler of Alleged FBI Spy Cuts Deal
He Pleads Guilty to Lying About Affair in Case Involving Chinese Intelligence
By Susan Schmidt and Kimberly Edds
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, May 13, 2004; Page A03

A former FBI counterintelligence supervisor pleaded guilty yesterday to lying about a long-running sexual affair he had with a prized bureau informant now accused of spying for China.

In a plea agreement that could keep him out of jail, James J. Smith appeared before a federal judge in Los Angeles and admitted that he had concealed his affair with Katrina Leung during a routine FBI background review in 2000.

Smith, 60, agreed to cooperate with the government's ongoing investigation into Leung's suspected 20-year penetration of FBI counterintelligence efforts, which could include testifying against her if she is tried next year. In exchange, charges involving mail fraud and mishandling of classified documents against Smith will be dropped.

By agreeing to the unusually light sentence, officials said, the government hopes to build a stronger case against Leung, speed its damage assessment and avoid having to air more national security information during a trial.

Leung's suspected spying has been a blow to the FBI's troubled national security division, which previously failed to detect that counterintelligence agent Robert P. Hanssen sold secrets to the Russians for 20 years. Hanssen was arrested in 2001 and is serving a life sentence .

The Leung case also has forced the U.S. intelligence community to rethink much of what it thought it knew about Chinese intentions.

Leung, a Chinese American recruited by Smith in 1982, quickly became one of the intelligence community's most valued Chinese assets, one with contacts in the top ranks of the Chinese government. Code named "Parlor Maid," she brought the FBI information about Chinese military and intelligence capabilities, political intentions, and efforts to influence U.S. electoral politics that was circulated to presidents and foreign leaders. All of it is now suspect.

A special FBI inspection team also has been trying to assess what influence she may have had on Chinese espionage cases, including two high-profile probes involving Smith that foundered badly: the nuclear secrets investigations of Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee and TRW Inc. contractor Peter H. Lee. Wen Ho Lee, who spent nine months in jail, pleaded guilty to a single felony after the government's case crumbled. Peter Lee confessed in 1997 to transferring classified material to China but served no jail time.
Leung, who was paid $1.7 million by her FBI handlers, had an off-and-on sexual relationship with another former FBI counterintelligence agent during some of the years that she was involved with Smith. William Cleveland Jr., formerly an agent in San Francisco and then security chief at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, has cooperated with investigators and was not charged in the case.

Smith, accompanied by his wife and grown son, said little in the courtroom beyond his admission of guilt. His attorney, Brian Sun, said afterward that Smith is barred under the terms of his agreement with prosecutors from talking to the media until Leung's case is resolved.

"He's acknowledged he had a relationship he probably shouldn't have had on duty because he was having a relationship with an asset," Sun said. But, he asserted that "this plea confirms he did not engage in any conduct that jeopardized national security."

Four remaining counts of the indictment against Smith will be dismissed when he is sentenced in January if the government is satisfied with his cooperation. He faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison, but U.S. District Judge Florence-Marie Cooper said she did not "anticipate this punishment will be imposed in this case." Smith, who retired at 57, also will be allowed to keep his FBI pension.

In addition to not telling the bureau of his affair with Leung, Smith also was accused of withholding his discovery in 1991 that the Chinese government knew that the FBI had her on its payroll as an informant.

Counterintelligence agents in San Francisco discovered that Leung had had unauthorized conversations with a Chinese intelligence official. Smith, her handler, was notified and a meeting was held at FBI headquarters. In charging Smith, the government said he did not reveal then or later that he was sexually involved with Leung.

When Smith confronted Leung about the conversations with the Chinese official, according to court papers, Leung told him she had passed "secret unauthorized communications" to the Chinese, something he did not then tell the bureau.

Smith was accused of taking classified documents to Leung's home, where she gained access to them and copied them. They included a document related to the espionage investigation of Peter Lee, whose plea agreement with authorities, which involved no jail time, was later questioned by members of Congress.

In a written statement yesterday, Leung's attorneys, Janet Levine and John Vandevelde, said: "Although we may have to fight to the end because the FBI has tried to protect its own and shift blame for their mistakes to Katrina, an outsider, a Chinese American and a woman, we are confident that this case is much ado about nothing and Katrina Leung will be vindicated."

Leung is charged with copying national security documents and unauthorized possession of those documents. Her attorneys have said they plan to take advantage of limitations imposed on the government by national security concerns.

"We expect the government will have to make hard decisions about whether to publicly disclose 20 years worth of spying secrets in order to pursue an ill-advised prosecution," the defense team said in a statement last year.


See also:

http://www.americanpolitics.com/031699Gillis.html
The Dirty Secrets About the Los Alamos Secrets
by Jack Gillis
...
At the 26-minute mark a woman who had lived in the vicinity of Los Alamos before the 80s called and told Brandon that "security was very good" then, but that The Reagan Administration privatized security. "Didn't that make a great difference?" she concluded.

Brandon's expression froze for a moment before melting into thoughtfulness as he pondered his answer. "Well, I'm out now, so I can say," he thought out loud, "Yes."

Yes, he said. "I think it may have made a difference."


http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2004/07/21/MNGCC7Q7B61.DTL

Energy secretary blasts lab for lapses
UC-run Los Alamos can't keep its secrets, says irate Abraham

James Sterngold, Chronicle Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 21, 2004


Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham issued a blistering rebuke of Los Alamos National Laboratory late Tuesday, saying the nuclear weapons lab managed by the University of California appeared incapable of protecting its secrets and threatening to fire managers responsible for the failures.

Nearly all work was halted at the lab after portable computer devices filled with sensitive information disappeared recently. The incident was just the latest in a string of security lapses at the research center.

Abraham said senior federal officials sent to examine the latest lapse had found widespread management weaknesses, even outside the division that lost the devices. He also said the lab had no effective means of holding people accountable for the security problems.

Some of the staff members at the lab, which is a repository of the country's most important nuclear secrets, "fail to understand the seriousness of the situation," he concluded, adding that he would take "meaningful administrative and disciplinary action at an appropriate time," though he offered no specifics.

The University of California, which has managed Los Alamos since it was formed in secret to create the first atomic bomb six decades ago, has faced withering criticisms ever since the oversight problems began surfacing in 1999. In that year it was disclosed that a weapons scientist, Wen Ho Lee, had gone undetected while improperly downloading a huge volume of nuclear secrets, some of which then disappeared.

...

"I'm just baffled," said Agnew, who is an adviser to the UC president on lab issues. "I don't understand how they can lose these things."

A previous scandal erupted in late 2002 when a string of management and security abuses were uncovered. Initially, UC responded by firing the two security officers it had hired to tighten internal controls after they found evidence of widespread abuses and lax procedures.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE5DC153EF930A25755C0A9669C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2

NUCLEAR SECRETS REPORTED MISSING FROM LOS ALAMOS
Published: June 13, 2000

...
Energy Department and Los Alamos officials said the latest incident occurred long after Dr. Lee was dismissed and added that there was no evidence of any connection between the missing hard drives and Dr. Lee's case.

Congressional leaders reacted sharply today to the news of another security lapse at the laboratory.

''While we don't know whether the hard drives are lost, it gravely concerns me that they have even been displaced,'' said Senator Frank H. Murkowski, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, which conducted hearings on laboratory security last year.


http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE5DB153FF935A35750C0A96F958260

BREACH AT LOS ALAMOS: A special report.; China Stole Nuclear Secrets For Bombs, U.S. Aides Say

Published: March 6, 1999

The espionage is believed to have occurred in the mid-1980's, officials said. But it was not detected until 1995, when Americans analyzing Chinese nuclear test results found similarities to America's most advanced miniature warhead, the W-88.

By the next year, Government investigators had identified a suspect, an American scientist at Los Alamos laboratory, where the atomic bomb was developed. The investigators also concluded that Beijing was continuing to steal secrets from the Government's major nuclear weapons laboratories, which had been increasingly opened to foreign visitors since the end of the cold war.

TahoeBlue

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http://norfolk.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/bribery111708.htm

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2008
VIRGINIA PHYSICIST PLEADS GUILTY TO ILLEGALLY EXPORTING SPACE LAUNCH DATA TO CHINA AND OFFERING BRIBES TO CHINESE OFFICIALS

WASHINGTON – A physicist in Newport News, Va., has pleaded guilty today to charges that he illegally exported space launch technical data and defense services to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and offered bribes to Chinese government officials.

The guilty plea was announced today by Dana Boente, Acting U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Patrick Rowan, Assistant Attorney General for National Security; Matthew Friedrich, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division; Arthur M. Cummings, II, Executive Assistant Director, FBI National Security Branch; and Alex J. Turner, Special Agent-in-Charge, FBI Norfolk Division.

Shu Quan-Sheng (Shu), 68, a native of China, naturalized U.S. citizen and Ph.D. physicist, entered his plea before Judge Henry C. Morgan, Jr. in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. Shu is the President, Secretary and Treasurer of AMAC International Inc., (AMAC), a high-tech company based in Newport News and that has offices in Beijing.

Shu pleaded guilty to a three-count criminal information. Count one alleges that from January 2003 through October 2007, Shu violated the Arms Export Control Act by willfully exporting a defense service from the United States to the PRC without first obtaining the required export license or written approval from the State Department. Specifically, the information alleges that Shu provided the PRC with assistance in the design and development of a cryogenic fueling system for space launch vehicles to be used at the heavy payload launch facility located in the southern island province of Hainan, PRC.

The space launch facility at Hainan will house liquid-propelled heavy payload launch vehicles designed to send space stations and satellites into orbit, as well as provide support for manned space flight and future lunar missions, according to a criminal complaint filed in the case. Among those PRC government entities involved in the Hainan facility are the People's Liberation Army's General Armaments Department and the 101st Research Institute (101 Institute), which is one of many research institutes that make up the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, as overseen by the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for the National Defense, according to the criminal complaint. 

Count two of the criminal information alleges that on Dec. 20, 2003, Shu violated the Arms Export Control Act by willfully exporting a defense article to the PRC without first obtaining the required export license or written approval from the State Department. Specifically, the information alleges that Shu illegally exported to the PRC controlled military technical data contained in a document entitled “Commercial Information, Technical Proposal and Budgetary Officer – Design, Supply, Engineering, Fabrication, Testing & Commissioning of 100m3 Liquid Hydrogen Tank and Various Special Cryogenic Pumps, Valves, Filters and Instruments.”

Count three of the criminal information alleges that Shu offered, paid, promised and authorized the payment of bribes to Chinese government officials to influence their decisions and secure an improper advantage, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, Shu, acting on behalf of his company, AMAC, and a French company he represented, offered to pay money to foreign officials of the PRC’s 101 Institute to obtain a contract for the development of a 600 liter per hour liquid hydrogen tank system, according to the information.

The criminal information indicates that Shu offered money on three occasions to three PRC officials with the 101 Institute to secure the contract. In February 2006, he offered “percentage points” worth approximately $56,800. In April 2006, he offered “percentage points” worth some $56,800, and in May 2006, he offered “percentage points” worth approximately $75,700, for a total of $189,300, according to the criminal information. In January 2007, the $4 million hydrogen liquefier project was awarded to the French company that Shu represented.

Sentencing in this matter is scheduled for April 6, 2009, where Shu faces a possible maximum sentence of 10 years in prison and a fine of $1,000,000 for each violation of the Arms Export Control Act, and a possible maximum sentence of five years in prison and a fine of $250,000 or twice the gross gain for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

This investigation was conducted by the FBI, with assistance from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement. 

http://www.outlookseries.com/news/Security/5456.htm

Virginia Physicist Shu Quan-Sheng Arrested for Illegally Exporting Space Launch Data to China and Offering Bribes to Chinese Officials
Sept. 24, 2008


Shu Quan-Sheng (“Shu”), 68, a native of China, naturalized U.S. citizen and PhD physicist, was arrested in Newport News by FBI agents. Shu is the President, Secretary and Treasurer of AMAC International (“AMAC”), a high-tech company located in Newport News. AMAC International also has an office in Beijing, China. Shu made his initial appearance earlier today in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division.

Shu is charged in a criminal complaint with unlawfully exporting a defense service to foreign persons without prior approval, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act; unlawfully exporting a defense article in violation of the Arms Export Control Act; and bribing, offering a bribe, and attempting to bribe a foreign government official, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Shu faces a possible sentence of 10 years in prison for each violation of the Arms Export Control Act, and five years in prison for violating the FCPA.

According to the complaint, beginning in or around January 2003, Shu provided technical assistance and foreign technology acquisition expertise to several PRC government entities involved in the design, development, engineering and manufacture of a space launch facility in the southern island province of Hainan, PRC. This facility will house liquid-propelled heavy payload launch vehicles designed to send space stations and satellites into orbit, as well as provide support for manned space flight and future lunar missions.

Among those PRC government entities involved in the space launch facility in Hainan are the People's Liberation Army's General Armaments Department and the 101st Research Institute (101 Institute), which is one of many research institutes that make up the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, as overseen by the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for the National Defense. The Beijing Special Engineering Design Research Institute (BSEDRI) is the governmental entity responsible for the procurement of cryogenic liquid storage tanks for the Hainan launch facility

According to the complaint, Shu has been involved in the PRC's systematic effort to upgrade their space exploration and satellite technology capabilities by providing technical expertise and foreign technology acquisition in the fields of cryogenic pumps, valves, transfer lines and refrigeration equipment, components critical for the use of liquefied hydrogen in a launch facility. Shu has also been instrumental in arranging for PRC officials to visit various European space launch facilities and hydrogen production/storage facilities.

Shu's efforts include the successful brokering of a January 2007 contract between the PRC’s 101 Institute and a French company for the production and supply of a 600 liter per hour hydrogen liquefier. This liquefier will be part of the 101 Institute's comprehensive research, development, and test base for liquid-propelled engines and space vehicle components, and at the time, the liquefier represented the first in as many as five additional projects to be undertaken by AMAC and the French company, all to be used as ground-based support for the launch vehicles at the Hainan launch facility.

Shu is accused of illegally exporting technical data related to the design and manufacture of a “Standard 100 M3 Liquid Hydrogen (LH) 2 Tank,” and illegally providing assistance to foreign persons in the design, development, assembly, testing or modification of the “Standard 100 M3 LH2 Tank” and related components of fueling systems for a foreign launch facility. At no time during this period did Shu have the required licenses or written approvals with respect to brokering, export of defense articles, or proposals to provide defense services to the PRC.

The complaint also alleges that Shu offered bribes to government officials with the PRC’s 101 Institute to induce the award of the hydrogen liquefier project to the French company Shu represented. According to the complaint, on Dec. 1, 2003, Shu and his company AMAC entered into an agreement with the French company establishing AMAC and Shu as the French company’s representative in China. The agreement provided that AMAC was entitled to a success fee of ten to fifteen percent.

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We need to stop importing everything from china until we do things are just going to get worse!

TahoeBlue

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"US-China Economic and Security Review Commission"  2008 report
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2008/annual_report_full_08.pdf


DEAR SENATOR BYRD AND SPEAKER PELOSI:
On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, we are pleased to transmit the Commission’s 2008 Annual
Report to the Congress—the sixth major Report presented to Congress by the Commission—pursuant to Public Law 106–398 (October
30, 2000), as amended by Public Law 109–108 (November 22, 2005). This report responds to the mandate for the Commission ‘‘to
monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China.’’ In this Report, the Commission reached a broad and bipartisan consensus;
it approved the Report unanimously, with all 12 members voting to approve and submit it.

In accordance with our mandate, this Report includes detailed treatment of our investigations of the areas identified by Congress
for our examination and recommendation. 

These areas are:

• PROLIFERATION PRACTICES—The role of the People’s Republic of China in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and other weapons (including dual-use technologies), including actions the United States might take to encourage the People’s
Republic of China to cease such practices;

• ECONOMIC TRANSFERS—The qualitative and quantitative nature of the transfer of United States production activities to
the People’s Republic of China, including the relocation of high technology, manufacturing, and research and development facilities,
the impact of such transfers on United States national security, the adequacy of United States export control laws, and the
effect of such transfers on United States economic security and employment;

• ENERGY—The effect of the large and growing economy of the People’s Republic of China on world energy supplies and the role
the United States can play (including joint research and development efforts and technological assistance) in influencing the energy
policy of the People’s Republic of China;

• UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS—The extent of access to and use of United States capital markets by the People’s Republic
of China, including whether or not existing disclosure and transparency rules are adequate to identify People’s Republic of
China companies engaged in harmful activities;

• REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPACTS—The triangular economic and security relationship among the United
States, [Taiwan] and the People’s Republic of China (including the military modernization and force deployments of the People’s
Republic of China aimed at [Taiwan]), the national budget of the People’s Republic of China, and the fiscal strength of the People’s
Republic of China in relation to internal instability in the People’s Republic of China and the likelihood of the externalization
of problems arising from such internal instability;

• UNITED STATES–CHINA BILATERAL PROGRAMS—Science and technology programs, the degree of noncompliance by
the People’s Republic of China with agreements between the United States and the People’s Republic of China on prison labor
imports and intellectual property rights, and United States enforcement policies with respect to such agreements;

• WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION COMPLIANCE—The compliance of the People’s Republic of China with its accession agreement
to the World Trade Organization; and

• FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION—The implications of restrictions on speech and access to information in the People’s Republic of
China for its relations with the United States in the areas of economic and security policy.

The Commission conducted its work through a comprehensive set of nine public hearings, taking testimony from over 92 witnesses
from the Congress, the executive branch, industry, academia, policy groups, and other experts. It conducted eight of these hearings in
Washington, DC, and conducted one field hearing in New Orleans, Louisiana, on seafood imported into the United States. For each of
its hearings, the Commission produced a transcript (posted on its Web site—www.uscc.gov). The Commission also received a number
of briefings by officials of executive branch agencies, intelligence community agencies, and the armed services, including two days of
classified briefings on China’s cyber operations and espionage. (The Commission is preparing a classified report to Congress on those
topics.)

Commissioners also conducted official visits to China, Hong
Kong, and Taiwan, and to South Korea and Japan to hear and discuss
the perspectives of those nations on China and its global and
regional activities. In these visits, the Commission delegations met
with U.S. diplomats, host government officials, representatives of
the U.S. and foreign business communities, and local experts.
The Commission also relied substantially on the work of its excellent
professional staff, and supported outside research in accordance
with our mandate.

The Report includes 45 recommendations for Congressional action.
Our 10 most important recommendations appear on page 17
at the conclusion of the Executive Summary.
We offer this Report to the Congress in the hope that it will be
useful as an updated baseline for assessing progress and challenges
in U.S.-China relations.

Thank you for the opportunity to serve. We look forward to continuing
to work with you in the next Congress to address issues of
concern in the U.S.-China relationship.

reference:

15 November 2007
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7097296.stm

China spying 'biggest US threat'
 
The US must boost its computer security, congressional advisers say
Chinese espionage poses "the single greatest risk" to the security of US technology, a panel has told Congress.
China is pursuing new technology "aggressively", it says, legitimately through research and business deals and illegally through industrial espionage.

China has also "embraced destructive warfare techniques", the report says, enabling it to carry out cyber attacks on other countries' infrastructure.

A foreign ministry spokesman in Beijing denied any spying activities by China.

"China and the US have a fundamental common interest in promoting sound and rapid development," said Liu Jianchao, quoted by the Associated Press news agency.


The allegations were made by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in its annual report.
 

comp

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How did this DSP in 100s enter in CHINA, or are they counterfeits made in china.
See the picture of freely available military aircraft component in China, which is sold all over world for less than 10% of its original value by mfr.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/kristalsnider/3336083998/

TahoeBlue

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Yes there is money in Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace...  will back-doored/defective bootleg military parts find there way into our armed forces?

http://www.intelligencesearch.com/ia055.html
Chinese Spy Exposes CCP Espionage Network in Europe
July 5, 2005

LONDON - In order to gain competitive advantage in global commerce, the Beijing authorities have laid a meticulous industrial espionage network throughout Europe, which penetrated all levels of the key industries in Europe including national defense, aerospace, chemistry, heavy industry and communication. This spying has taken place for at least 10 years and is causing serious concerns to the governments in Europe; countries including England have already started to fully investigate it.
On the other hand, a recent report by U.S. House of Representatives states that China’s breakthroughs in many scientific and technological fields were achieved by the information obtained through industrial espionage. Those include a supercomputer that runs at speeds previously achieved only by America and Japan, sophisticated communication system and satellite technology, etc.

Experts hold China’s recent advances in the sensitive Taiwan Strait military force is also the result of Chinese espionage against United States. It includes the new cruise missile system that mimics the American Tomahawk cruise missile and the coast defense system that was developed by stealing the blue print of the American Aegis weapons systems

A senior Chinese spy that has been dispatched to stay in Europe for long-term recently defected in Belgium and exposed the Beijing authorities’ plan of obtaining European advanced industrial information and dominating the global industry. The Belgium intelligence expert says the Chinese industrial espionage network in Europe is not only large-scale, but also very penetrating.

The British Daily Telegraph reported that this Chinese spy defector has already turned over the names of several hundred other spies in Europe and detailed their espionage activity to the Belgian government. Because many countries have been penetrated, governments including Germany, France, Holland, Belgium and England have all started full investigations.

As the defector has so far not been granted political asylum, he refuses to appear in public. According to intelligence officials, this defector is a full-time student, who holds a high-ranking position at the Chinese Students and Scholars Association of Leuven (CSSAL) in Belgium, and he is in charge of coordinating Chinese industrial espionage in Europe. (Note: the President of the Brussels-based European Center for Strategic and Security Studies (ESISC), Mr. Moniquet, said that this defected spy had been working at a European university and company for ten years. He is only an ordinary member of CSSAL and has not held any high-ranking positions.)

Intelligence officials say that CSSAL helps Beijing officials to stay in contact with Chinese people in different social classes. Whether they are secret agents at embassies, post-graduate students sent to study abroad in Europe or private individuals, they have all independently worked for five to ten years.

Belgian officials pointed out that the French-based communication company Alcatel is a target of infiltration by Chinese industrial spies in Europe. Alcatel obtained a one billion euros (1.2 billion $US) partnership agreement with its Galileo satellite navigation system, which is considered by European leaders to be competitive with the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS.)

Intelligence officials say that thanks to the information collected by secret agents, China has been able to successfully become a partner in Galileo satellite navigation system.

Chinese spies have not only infiltrated Europe, they have also penetrated the United States. FBI officials in charge of counter-espionage said that China is rapidly weakening the United States’technological advantages. One official said this was evident when China could produce something that would normally take a decade of development in just two or three years.

This official went on to say that China’s intelligence work is used in every area, including personal business, industry, and institutional technological research; nothing is left out.

TahoeBlue

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How the Chinese acquired Strong Encryption, Fiber Technology and Tiger Song with the help of SRI, Condoleezza Rice, William Perry, Dr. John Lewis and the Clinton Administration

http://www.whale.to/b/ric.html
Condoleezza, while at Hoover Inst. assisted Clinton Defense Sec. Wm. Perry in successful Chinese PLA penetration of Pentagon/military
Wednesday, Jan. 24, 2001

The Chinese Army Spy and Condoleezza Rice
By: Charles R. Smith

Condoleezza Rice, national security adviser to President Bush, has recently granted an interview to virtually every reporter but me. Perhaps it is because I keep asking her questions about the Chinese spy in her
past.

Rice has impeccable credentials. She worked for the elder George Bush in the White House, handling Russian issues. She is a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution and former provost of Stanford University. Rice
is very close to former Clinton Secretary of Defense William Perry. Rice worked with Perry and the Clinton administration during her term at Stanford. The Clinton White House once mentioned her as being on the
short list for secretary of state
.

Yet it is her years at Stanford working with Perry that have rendered Rice silent. While working at Stanford, she became involved in the most successful Chinese army penetration of the Clinton Defense Department.
She will not answer questions about her relationship with Chinese spy Hua Di.


Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. He studied missiles in Russia and worked for the Chinese army missile program for 24 years. In 1984, he went to work for the China International Trust and Investment Co. (CITIC), a firm then part-owned by the Chinese army.

Hua defected to the United States in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy demonstrators. He went to work as a researcher at Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control. There he met Rice and the Stanford Center co-directors, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and political science professor John Lewis.

In 1994, Hua used his contacts at Stanford, in Beijing and inside the Clinton Defense Department with then-Secretary Perry to obtain a secure fiber-optic communication system for the Chinese army. In 1994, Hua contacted an old friend in the Chinese army then working for Gen. Ding Henggao, a close friend of Perry.

In fact, Perry and Ding's relationship spans three administrations. Perry reportedly met Gen. Ding in the late 1970s during the Carter administration. By 1994, Perry ran the U.S. Defense Department, and Ding
had risen to command the Chinese army military research bureau COSTIND
, or the Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National Defense. COSTIND, according to the General Accounting Office, "oversees development of China's weapon systems and is responsible for identifying
and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for military use."



Hua Di teamed in 1994 with Stanford Dr. John Lewis, Secretary of Defense Perry, and Gen. Ding of the Chinese Army to buy an advanced AT&T fiber-optic communications system for "civilian" use inside China. The communications system slipped past U.S. exports laws as a joint U.S.-Chinese commercial venture called Hua Mei. The Chinese part of the venture was run by a newly formed firm named Galaxy New Technology.

Hua Di described himself as the "matchmaker" between the Chinese Army and Lewis during an interview for the Far Eastern Economic Review. Hua arranged for Gen. Ding's wife, Madam Nie Li, to head the joint project as the Chinese co-chairman.

Stanford's Lewis, himself a board member of the project, located Adlai Stevenson III, the former Democrat senator from Illinois, to lead the American side. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, Lewis had Defense Secretary Perry write a personal letter on his behalf to U.S. government officials, favoring the export to China.

With Perry's blessing, Hua Di and Lewis contracted AT&T to ship the secure communication systems directly to a Chinese Army unit using Galaxy New Technology as a front. AT&T officials who sold most of the equipment and software were adamant that there was no need to check the Chinese firm since the "civilian" Madam Nie Lie led it.

Yet, the so-called "civilian" firm was actually packed with Chinese army officers and experts. Madam Nie Lie was not only the wife of Gen. Ding Henggao; she was actually Lt. Gen. Nie Lie of the Chinese Army.

Another member of New Galaxy Technology, according to a Defense Department document, was Director and President "Mr. Deng Changru." Deng is also known as Lt. Col. Deng Changru of the People's Liberation Army, head of the PLA communications corps. Still another Chinese army officer on the Galaxy New Technology staff was Co-General Manager "Mr. Xie Zhichao," better known in military circles as Lt. Col. Xie Zhichao, director of the Chinese Army Electronics Design Bureau.

In fact, the evidence shows that Lewis worked not only for Stanford and the Chinese army during this time period. Documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) show that he also worked for the U.S. Defense Department.

In August 1994, Lewis and Secretary of Defense Perry traveled to Beijing to meet with Gen. Ding Henggao. According to the official list of attendees, Lewis accompanied Perry as his "personal" consultant. Lewis,
then a paid consultant of the U.S. Defense Department, met in Beijing with Ding, who was also then Lewis's partner inside a joint U.S. Chinese "commercial venture" for military communications systems.

In 1997, Stanford professor Lewis was charged with using university funding and equipment to set up the deal with Galaxy New Technology.  Stanford Provost Condoleeza Rice announced that Lewis faced an
investigation because he had used university stationery and his office to run the joint U.S-Chinese business. In the 1997 investigation, Rice issued a statement to the university press.

"We'll follow what is a normal process under these circumstances," said Rice in the 1997 interview. "Similar issues arise quite frequently. It's not all that unusual that issues arise concerning conflict of interest."

Yet, no formal charges were filed, and Rice quietly dropped the investigation against Lewis and Hua Di. To this day, Ms. Rice will not answer why she stopped the investigation.

The General Accounting Office also documented the New Galaxy Technology scandal (GAO report GAO/NSIAD-97-5). According to the GAO, the scandal involved the "transfer of broadband  telecommunications equipment to Hua Mei, a joint venture between SCM Brooks Telecommunications, a U.S. limited partnership, and Galaxy New Technology, a Chinese company primarily owned by an agency of the Chinese military."

In 1997, Rep. Henry Hyde pressed Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate the Galaxy New Technology scandal in a letter outlining his concerns.

 According to Hyde, "in 1994, sophisticated telecommunications technology was transferred to a U.S.-Chinese joint venture called HUA MEI, in which the Chinese partner is an entity controlled by the Chinese military. This particular transfer included fiber-optic communications equipment, which is used for high-speed, secure communications over long distances. Also included in the package was advanced encryption software."

By the end of 1997 the scandal was drawing too much heat for Hua Di to remain in the United States. In an article curiously released in October 1998, the New York Times announced that Hua Di had returned to China in December 1997.

According to the New York Times, Hua met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On Dec. 31, 1997, he returned to China. On Jan. 6, 1998, he was arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials. In 1999, according to the official Chinese news service, Chinese defector and missile scientist Hua Di was sentenced in a people's court to 15 years for passing state secrets to the United States.

The end of this story is not very pretty. Stanford officials, including Rice and Lewis, have openly appealed to the Chinese government for Hua's release. Rice also continues to defend Hua.

Rice stated in a New York Times interview that Lewis "provided evidence to the fact that the source materials for publications written by him and Mr. Hua were provided by approved Chinese authorities or already were
available through the Stanford University library."

Yet, Rice will not talk about Hua Di and the Galaxy New Technology deal. There was more than profit for Hua and the Chinese Army company packed with electronics experts. The secure fiber optic communication system delivered by Hua to his People's Liberation Army general buddies was modified in 1998 and now serves as a secure air-defense system exported to Iraq.

The current Iraqi air defense network, NATO code-named "Tiger Song," is made of U.S. and French fiber optic parts modified and re-exported by the People's Liberation Army. Tiger Song is based on the original secure AT&T system obtained by Hua Di in 1994. Iraqi missiles guided by Tiger Song have repeatedly attacked U.S. fighter jets.

According to an August 2000 Washington Times interview, Rice asserted, "China is not a threat."

Tiger Song is considered a lethal threat to American and allied armed forces. Such sweet irony that we now face our own weapons and they are not a threat.

Still, all seems to be well between Beijing and Bush. Condoleeza Rice is national security adviser to the president, and the Chinese Army again has a "matchmaker" inside the White House. Just don't ask her about Chinese army spy Hua Di.  


No, the Chinese don't want there bird to fly anymore....

http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9810/29/china.arrest/index.html

Stanford scholar imprisoned in China on espionage charge
 
Permanent U.S. resident reportedly has cancer
October 29, 1998
Web posted at: 9:14 p.m. EST (0214 GMT)

PALO ALTO, California (CNN) -- A Stanford University scholar suffering from a rare form of cancer has been imprisoned in China for the past 10 months, university officials confirmed Thursday.

Hua Di, a Chinese missile expert with permanent U.S. residency status, was arrested in Beijing on January 6, just one week after arriving on his first trip back to China since fleeing from the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.

Stanford officials said Hua was charged with leaking state secrets -- a potentially serious espionage charge apparently based on his published work about China's ballistic missile program.

In Washington, State Department deputy spokesman James Foley said the United States is "seeking further information" about Hua's arrest. He said officials at the U.S. embassy have discussed the matter with Chinese officials.

University unable to free scholar

After months of fruitless, behind-the-scenes work lobbying quietly for Hua's release, the university decided to take its case public this week after news of the arrest began leaking out in Chinese-language media.

Stanford Provost Condoleezza Rice issued a statement expressing confidence that Hua would be cleared of any spying charges.

"Source materials (cited in Hua's works) ... all were either provided by approved Chinese authorities or already available through the Stanford University library," Rice said. "Stanford values Hua Di as a colleague and a scholar, and we hope for his immediate release."

The San Jose Mercury News reported that Hua, 62, suffers from a rare form of male breast cancer and was to have started chemotherapy upon returning from what he planned to be a short trip home for a family memorial service. His health has deteriorated during his months in prison, the newspaper quoted a source close to his family as saying.

Hua, who won a state prize in 1978 for his redesign of the rocket guidance system that launched China's first satellite, had been a research chief at an economic development institute in China before leaving for the United States in 1989.

China issued an arrest warrant for him that year after he signed a document, along with three other research officials, denouncing the political crackdown that preceded the bloodshed around Tiananmen Square.

Later, China reportedly charged him in absentia in connection with an article he wrote about Chinese missile technology that appeared in a Harvard University journal.

A permanent U.S. resident, Hua had been scheduled to receive his U.S. citizenship in July, the Mercury News said. But he took the chance of returning to China before getting the passport in order to attend the memorial service.

The newspaper said that despite his political problems, Hua had managed to keep relatively close ties with certain elements in the Chinese military and that he had taken the precaution of meeting with Chinese security officials in Hong Kong prior to his trip for assurances of safe passage.

But he was arrested within days of his December 31, 1997, arrival and formally charged in February, the newspaper said.

TahoeBlue

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The "New" Tiger Song - Since we brought up Tiger Song let's see what that has to do with the Chinese trying to acquire 3COM. hmmm....

http://blog.barofintegrity.us/2008/01/01/mitt-romneys-new-tiger-song.aspx
Mitt Romney's New 'Tiger Song'

Background:

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1916444/posts
China Angles to Buy 3Com

Excerpt:

According to the CIA, Huawei was responsible for the installation of an advanced fiber-optic air defense network in Iraq during Saddam’s brutal rule. The Huawei network, NATO code-named “Tiger Song,” was used to shoot down allied aircraft flying patrol over the Iraqi skies.

The network was installed in violation of an U.N. embargo. Worse still, the air defense network was paid for by the corrupt oil-for-food program which send cash to Huawei that was intended to feed starving Iraqi children.

Despite its history of killing American soldiers — it is Huawei’s teaming with Bain and Goldman Sachs that has enabled the Chinese company to arrange the buyout of 3Com. The Bain/Goldman/Huawei team has influence inside the highest political circles.

For example, current Republican candidate Mitt Romney has links to Bain. Gov. Romney enjoyed a successful career at Bain, helping to amass over a quarter of a billion dollars in his own personal fortune. Romney may have left the company in 2001, but he and his family still own a significant stake in the firm through his blind trust, which according to the Washington Post earned him $7 million to $15 million during the last year.

Bain associates, employees and friends have also been very generous to Gov. Romney’s campaign for the White House. Bain employees have donated over $190,000 to Romney, making the firm one of his largest sources of political cash. This amount does not include the efforts of former and current Bain partners and executives of companies Romney bought who are also raising hundreds of thousands of dollars.

All these financial ties to Bain bring into question the possible conflict of interest that Romney faces. So far, Gov. Romney has refused to comment on the Bain deal. Repeated calls to the Romney campaign were not returned.

------------------------------------------------------------------
Most are not familiar with Huawei. The company’s founder, Ren Zhengfei is a former officer of the People’s Liberation Army.

Excerpt:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG334.pdf
A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry

Huawei Shenzhen Technology Company. Huawei was founded in 1988 by Ren Zhengfei, a former director of the PLA General Staff Department’s Information Engineering Academy, which is responsible for telecom research for the Chinese military. Huawei maintains deep ties with the Chinese military, which serves a multi-faceted role as an important customer, as well as Huawei’s political patron and research and development partner. Both the government and the military tout Huawei as a national champion, and the company is currently China’s largest, fastest-growing, and most impressive telecommunications-equipment manufacturer...

In analyzing the dynamics of the IT sector, it is first necessary to divide the defense portion of the IT sector into two related but distinct categories. The first includes those subsectors providing the PLA with commercial-off-the-shelf IT systems, such as routers, switches, and computers, which have become increasingly central to the digitization of the U.S. military. Key companies in this category include such “red chips” (the Chinese equivalent of U.S. blue-chip companies) as Huawei, Zhongxing, Datang, Julong, and the Wuhan Research Institute, all of which are private companies spun off from state research institutes that enjoy national-champion preferences within the system. They are marked by new facilities in dynamic locales, such as southern and eastern China, a high-tech workforce, and infusions of foreign technology. These firms are not obligated to provide a social safety net for thousands of unemployable workers and their families in rural areas. Instead, they hire and fire staff using market-based incentives and stock options...

The two most important categories of Chinese IT firms, particularly in dealings with foreign multinationals, are telecommunications equipment and electronics. Publicly, the major players in telecommunications—Huawei, Datang, Zhongxing, and Great Dragon (Julong)—appear to be independent, private-sector actors. By contrast, many of the electronics firms are grouped under ostensibly commercially oriented conglomerates, such as China Electronics Corporation. However, one does not need to dig too deeply to discover that many of these electronics companies are the public face for, sprang from, or are significantly engaged in joint research with state research institutes under the Ministry of Information Industry, defense-industrial corporations, or the military. Indeed, each of the “four tigers” of the Chinese telecommunications equipment market (Huawei, Zhongxing, Datang, and Julong) originated from a different part of the existing state telecommunications research and development infrastructure, often from the internal telecommunications apparatus of different ministries or the military. These connections provide channels for personnel transfers, commercialization of state-sponsored R&D (”spin-off”), and militarization of commercial R&D (”spin-on”)...

Huawei has also become the most successful Chinese exporter of equipment, entering international markets in 1996. According to one source, “For the future, Huawei wants to be the Cisco of the PRC, but also is ambitious to become a global player.” The company is rapidly penetrating Africa, Russia, India, and many other areas ignored by Western telcos...

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

As part of its backbone infrastructure work, Huawei supplied secure fiber optic communications networks widely within the PLA, its missile networks and fire control/command and control systems, and would supply a variant, Tiger Song, to Iraq prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (during the 1990s) which greatly complicated US interdiction as previous Iraqi anti-air comm had been interceptable, targetable transmissions. The PRC was one of many UN embargo violators (which included our allies France and Germany as well as Russia)

http://www.afpc.org/crm/crm368.shtml

The Chinese-built “Tiger Song” fiber-optic air defense system used by Iraq is comprised of American-made technology obtained with a waiver from the Clinton Administration… The advanced fiber-optic system was a result of the friendship between General Ding Henggao, Commander of the Chinese Army military research bureau COSTIND [Commission on Science and Industry for National Defense] and then-US Defense Secretary William Perry...

In 1994, Professor John Lewis of Stanford University… teamed with General Ding to buy an advanced AT&T fiber-optic communication system for “civilian use” inside China. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, [Perry] wrote a letter to US Government export control officials, favoring the fiber-optic export to China. The venture was called “Hua Mei.” The Chinese part of the venture was run by the newly formed firm, “Galaxy New Technology,” with General Ding’s wife, Madame Nie Li, as the head of the project.

With the support of Perry and the advice of Prof. Lewis, AT&T shipped the secure communications system directly to a Chinese Army unit, using Galaxy technology as a front. The so-called “civilian” Galaxy firm was packed with senior Chinese military officers… Madame Nie was not only the wife of General Ding, but actually Lt. General Nie Lie of the Chinese Army. Galaxy Director and president was Mr. Deng Changgru, also known as Lt. Colonel Deng Changru, head of the Chinese Army communcations corps. Co-General manager of Galaxy, “Mr.” Xie Zhichao, also known as Lt. Colonel Xie Zhichao, director of the Chinese Army’s Electronics Design Bureau…

“The Chinese army’s Electronics Bureau… modified the American fiber-optics communication system, changing it into a secure air-defense system. The Chinese military then exported the newly modified system to Iraq. The Iraqi air defense network, NATO code-named “Tiger Song,” is made of US and French fiber-optic parts modified by the Chinese military.”

In 2001, Iraqi anti-aircraft missiles, guided by Tiger Song, regularly target US fighter planes. And following the recent US-British attack on the system, Chinese military engineers are reportedly repairing damages to the system.

-------------------------------------------------------------------


HUNTER CALLS ON ROMNEY TO OPPOSE BAIN PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINESE COMPANY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: November 2, 2007

CONTACT: Gary Becks (619) 334-1655, dlhunter08@yahoo.com

San Diego, CA - - - Presidential candidate and current Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Duncan Hunter, today called on former Governor Mitt Romney to send a "clear statement" to the leadership of the company he founded, Bain Capital, to terminate a proposed business deal with a controversial Chinese corporation seeking to acquire U.S. defense contractor 3COM. Bain Capital is attempting to form a business arrangement with Huawei Corporation, a Chinese corporation founded by an officer of the Peoples Liberation Army of Communist China, which faces allegations of assisting Saddam Hussein in the targeting of U.S. aircraft and in helping the Taliban develop surveillance equipment.

"I am extremely concerned that Governor Romney's company would tout a highly suspect Chinese corporation as a strategic partner," stated Hunter. "Forming a business partnership with a corporation known to have direct ties with terrorists and dictators while, at the same time, openly seeking to acquire a major U.S. corporation that performs vital cyber security work for the Department of Defense, can only be characterized as irresponsible."

A resolution has been introduced in Congress, H.Res. 730, which states; "The preponderance of publicly available evidence clearly suggests that as currently structured, the proposed transaction involving Huawei threatens the national security of the United States and should not be approved by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States ." A copy of this resolution is provided.

Hunter stated in his letter to Governor Romney, "…while it is true that you no longer control Bain Capital, the contributions you have received from its principals as its founding member indicate that your influence within the company remains strong.

"Further, while the Committee on Foreign Investment has yet to rule on the Huawei transaction, this corporation's connection to Saddam Hussein, the Taliban and the Army of Communist China should clearly disqualify them from becoming, in the words of your former company, "a strategic partner" in acquiring a U.S. firm such as 3COM, which performs vital cyber-security work for the U.S. Department of Defense.

"This letter is a request that you immediately issue a statement of policy that this transaction should be terminated on the grounds of national security. Please let me know what you intend to do."

A copy of Congressman Hunter's letter, as well as two articles regarding Huawei acquisition efforts are provided. Media are encouraged to contact Gary Becks at (619) 334-1655 for additional information or to arrange an interview with Hunter.

# # #

Hunter for President, Inc. 9340 Fuerte Drive La Mesa, California 91941 United States

"Peace Through Strength" The need for military, economic and diplomatic strength.

Thank You

http://www.newsmax.com/smith/china_3com/2008/02/26/75627.html

Chinese Takeover Bid of 3Com Fails
Tuesday, February 26, 2008 10:05 AM
By: Charles R. Smith  

Score one for the good guys. The takeover bid of U.S. computer communications maker 3Com by a Chinese military related company has failed.

3Com announced that the bid was being withdrawn after it failed to answer national security questions issued by a government review committee.

The takeover raised serious questions about allowing a Chinese army related firm to do business in the U.S. and even buy out a Pentagon contractor. The Chinese company, Huawei, was directly linked by several intelligence reports to supplying air defense and communications networks to Saddam Hussein and the Taliban.

What is more troublesome is the bid nearly succeeded. At first the deal was not going to be reviewed for national security concerns and it was simply rubber-stamped by the Bush administration. However, news of the takeover prompted action, forcing a review but this was after the deal had already been OKed by the highest levels.

The Bush administration had trouble dealing with the takeover bid. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates revealed that he was completely in the dark about the deal. The admission by Gates echoed similar confessions by the Pentagon top brass that they also were unaware of the buyout.

The Defense Department and the U.S. intelligence agencies were surprised by the proposed deal and had to scramble in order to get it reviewed for national security reasons.

The failure at the Defense Department is attributed to the Defense Technology Security Agency or DTSA. During the Clinton years, DTSA was a strong advocate of checking all export deals with China. In fact, aggressive DTSA efforts were documented by the Loral Corporation for holding up the sale of advanced radars to the Chinese military. Today, DTSA is a headless giant unable to do its job.

The Pentagon has not appointed an active director to run DTSA and the length of time the position has been vacant suggests little sense of urgency to do so. Leaderless, DTSA was caught unaware of the deal and was unable to provide warning to senior Defense Department officials.


The current "acting" head of DTSA, Mrs. Beth M. McCormick, actually served during the Clinton administration under Defense Secretary William Perry. This fact alone should raise alarm bells.

Perry is directly linked to the export of the advanced communications systems that ended up in the Iraqi desert.

In 1994, Chinese Gen. Ding Henggao met with Perry to arrange a deal for advanced — secure — fiber-optic communications electronics. Ding was able to set his wife, Madam General Nie, up as head of a false corporation that obtained advanced U.S. fiber-optic systems. Madam Nie's company was allegedly staffed entirely by Chinese army officers who specialized in exploiting communications and electronics.

In fact, documents obtained from the Department of Defense using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) show that Perry's personal (paid) adviser was also paid by the Chinese army while serving on the U.S. Defense Policy Board and working for Perry as a contractor.

The Chinese agent assigned to Perry, Hua Di, called himself the "match-maker" in the fiber-optic deal. Hua Di was a former Chinese missile scientist who defected to the U.S. after the Tianamen Square massacre. Di worked closely with Perry and his associates in the Chinese army, including a PLA general assigned to Ding Henggao.

Immediately after the exports took place, Hua Di defected back to China and has not been heard from since. A cover story has been issued, claiming that Di was arrested by the Chinese government and may have died from cancer but no one can tell because he has not been seen since for nearly a decade.

The fiber-optic export was so controversial that the General Accounting Office wrote an entire report on how it would be exploited by the Chinese military. The 1994 export deal led to a flood of systems sold to Chinese army front companies. The Clinton administration was responsible for exporting the U.S. made communications and computer equipment to Huawei that ended up in Saddam's air defense network and in the hands of the Taliban.

Huawei, according to a report from the Rand Corporation, is run by a former Chinese air force general. Huawei obtained advanced fiber-optic electronics from the U.S. during the Clinton administration and then resold the equipment to Saddam Hussein for use as an air defense network. Huawei was caught in the act by the CIA, which documented its find in the Iraq Survey Group Final Report.

The Huawei network installed for Saddam allowed the Iraqi air defense network to shoot down U.S. and allied aircraft. Despite repeated bombings by the allies, the network continued to function literally until Saddam was overthrown.

Even after Saddam was overthrown, Defense Department officials knew full well of Huawei's involvement with the Iraqi dictator. A May 2004 report issued by the Department of Defense noted that Huawei was "a Chinese company that operated in Iraq under Saddam Hussein."


The Clinton administration unleashed the computer and communications exports to China in 1994 despite repeated protests from Defense officials and even a report by the General Accounting Office warning that such exports could be used for military purposes.


An ex-Clinton official, now running the agency charged to oversee these exports, messed up and the whole affair ended up dying after a real national security review took place. Expect the Chinese to try again. Huawei is not banned from the U.S. and an-ex Clinton official is the watchdog in charge of prevented any similar occurrences.


It is unlikely you will hear Hillary Clinton making any effort to comment on the Huawei deal. You will not hear about William Perry, his paid consultant or the Chinese double agent Hua Di in the mass media. Much too intellectual for the average Joe to understand that U.S. soldiers died because someone wanted to make a profit.

TahoeBlue

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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29188704/
Woman accused of illegal export to China

U.S. says items were miniature controls for small unmanned aircraft

updated 5:09 p.m. PT, Fri., Feb. 13, 2009
WASHINGTON - A Maryland woman has been arrested on charges of sending miniature controls for small unmanned aircraft to China.

The government says the controls are the world's smallest and involve a technology that cannot be shared with China because of national security concerns. The devices can be used to fly small military reconnaissance planes.

Yaming Nina Qi Hanson of Silver Spring, Md., is accused of sending the controls to China in August without a required license. If convicted, she faces a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine.

http://www.cicentre.com/spycase/ecoesp/HANSON_Yaming_Nina_Qi_Harold.html

Feds say husband Harold Hanson and wife Yaming Nina Qi Hanson sold tech to China
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gDbqCNhbESlbEfAT1qfYLnUpGZRQD96SP5600

A Walter Reed Army Medical Center worker and his wife were charged Thursday with conspiring to sell sensitive technology to China. A Washington grand jury indicted Harold Hanson, a former Army lieutenant colonel, and his wife, Yaming Nina Qi Hanson, for conspiracy and violating export laws.  The wife was charged last month in a criminal complaint. Her husband was working at Walter Reed as a civilian handling patient safety issues. Authorities allege that the Silver Spring, Md., couple exported miniature controls for unmanned aircraft. The controls involve technology that cannot be shared with China because of national security concerns. The devices are used to fly small military reconnaissance planes. Qi Hanson is accused of taking the controls to China last August without an export license.  Prosecutors say her husband arranged over e-mail to buy the controls from a Canadian company, MicroPilot of Manitoba. Company officials told the couple they could ship the controls to the United States but the couple would have to get an export permit to send the controls to another country. (AP, 12 Mar 09)
...
The Modern Mata Hari Speaks Mandarin
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/articles/20090308.aspx
Two Chinese women are being prosecuted for stealing American technology for China. A Maryland resident, Yaming Nina Qi Hanson, was caught exporting miniaturized autopilots for UAVs. An Illinois resident, Hanjuan Jin, was caught trying to get electronics design data (from her former employer, Motorola) to China. In both cases, the women were motivated by cash, and appeals to "help the motherland." Both these cases are part of a Chinese plan for using industrial espionage to turn their country into the mightiest industrial and military power on the planet. For over two decades, China has been attempting to do what the Soviet Union never accomplished; steal Western technology, then use it to move ahead of the West.

TahoeBlue

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Back to the original post:
Quote
Today's indictment charged Jian Wei Ding, Kok Tong Lim and Ping Cheng with seeking to send carbon-fiber to the China Academy of Space Technology. Besides spacecraft and rockets, carbon fiber is also used to enrich uranium.

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2009/03/25/2003439305
Singaporean man pleads guilty in US illegal exports case


AP , MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA
Wednesday, Mar 25, 2009, Page 7
A third man has pleaded guilty to his role in a plot to illegally export materials used in space and weapons technology to China, Hong Kong and Singapore, the US attorney’s office announced on Monday.

Jian Wei Ding, 50, of Singapore, pleaded guilty on Friday in the US District Court in Minneapolis to one count of conspiracy to violate export regulations. His co-defendants — Ping Cheng, 46, of Manhasset, New York, and Kok Tong Lim, 36, of Singapore — also pleaded guilty in recent weeks to one count of conspiracy.

In their plea agreements, the three men admitted that from March 23, 2007, through April 6 last year they conspired to violate export regulations by exporting and attempting to export high-modulus carbon-fiber material without a license.

The material is used in rockets, satellites, spacecraft and uranium enrichment. For national security reasons, a license from the US Department of Commerce is required to export it.

The plea agreements said Ding controlled several import and export firms, including one that acquired high-technology items for its customers. One of those customers is the China Academy of Space Technology, which builds satellites for the Chinese government.

Ding’s role was to manage the companies, maintain a relationship with the Chinese users of the material and provide money to buy the material. Cheng acted as the US agent for Ding’s companies and Lim’s role was to reach out to US suppliers.

The defendants dealt with an undercover Minnesota company that purported to be a supplier of aerospace commodities.

The men each face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and a maximum US$1 million fine. A sentencing date has not been set.



TahoeBlue

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Pentagon Official Accused of Passing Secrets to China in Unfolding Spy Case -  James Fondren - Tai Shen Kuo 

See above for:  Bergersen - Kuo
http://www.abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=7579861&page=1
Pentagon Official Accused of Passing Secrets to China in Unfolding Spy Case
Complaint Alleges that James Fondren Passed Along Documents from Classified Computers

By JASON RYAN
May 13, 2009

A mid-level Pentagon official working for U.S. Pacific Command now faces criminal charges in an ongoing espionage investigation for allegedly providing classified information to an agent of the Chinese government. James Fondren served as the Deputy Director of Pacific Command's liaison office and had a long friendship with Tai Shen Kuo, who was arrested and charged last year for passing sensitive information onto Chinese military and intelligence officials.

Fondren and Kuo were both friends and business associates. Prior to working at the Pentagon as a civilian, Fondren served as a Lt. Colonel in the U.S. Air Force and retired in 1996. Two years later, according to the criminal complaint, Fondren established a consulting company in Virginia whose sole client was Kuo, a naturalized US citizen from Taiwan who lived in Louisiana and ran two companies in the United States.

Kuo is also linked to Gregg Bergersen, a former policy analyst at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Kuo and Bergersen were arrested last February on espionage charges. Bergersen was accused of providing information on weapon sales to Taiwan and passing military communications security information to Kuo. Bergersen pleaded guilty to disclosing national defense information in March 2008 and was sentenced to 57 months in prison. Kuo pleaded guilty to conspiracy to disclosing national defense information a year ago and is currently serving a 15-year prison term.   [ see: http://cicentre.com/Documents/kuo_kang_bergersen.html ]

The criminal complaint unsealed today alleges that between November 2004 and February 2008, Fondren provided Kuo with documents he obtained from classified computers at the Pentagon. Specifically, an FBI affidavit in the case alleges that Fondren provided State Department cables and information on Naval exercises and sold Kuo DoD "opinion papers" at prices ranging from $350-800 a piece.

Kuo allegedly represented to Bergersen and Fondren that he was passing information he obtained to a high ranking general in the Taiwanese military when in reality according to the FBI he was receiving tasking instructions and what information to collect from a Chinese government official. According to the FBI, Kuo also maintained offices in China as part of his business ventures.

Kuo and Fondren's friendship allowed the Chinese agent to stay at Fondren's house in Annandale Virginia. According to the affidavit, FBI surveillance conducted on Fondren's home on March 3, 2007 establishes that Fondren provided Kuo with a draft DoD assessment of China's military power and told him, "This is the report I didn't want you to talk about over the phone….[if] people find out I did that, it will cost me my job." According to the FBI affidavit, although the Pentagon assessment of China's military strength was published 3 months later, many items in the draft report were not contained in the public version.

FBI Affidavit
In a statement today, Art Cummings, Executive Assistant Director of the FBI's national Security Branch said, "The complaint unsealed today alleges that Mr. Fondren conspired to steal our nation's secrets for a foreign government, placing his own interests over those of the citizens he served as a U.S. Government employee….Espionage is a profoundly serious crime."

Fondren was initially approached by FBI agents in August 2007, according to an FBI affidavit filed by Special Agent Robert Gibbs. Fondren told agents he maintained some contacts with foreign military officials and also stated he would never tell anyone anything they could not find by doing their own research from public sources or from newspaper articles.

According to the FBI affidavit, two days after the initial visit from the FBI agents, Fondren e-mailed Kuo alerting him that he had been interviewed by FBI counterintelligence agents: "I couldn't determine what they wanted, but I doubt that they are really interested in political, economic and security issues affecting Asian countries…The discussion seemed to be in a bizarre direction so I wanted you to be aware of my surprise visit in case you get a surprise also!"

When Kuo was arrested on February 12, 2008 he was staying as a guest in Fondren's house in Virginia. According to the FBI affidavit, "Among his possessions, Kuo had a draft copy of a DOD document entitled "The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2008, Version 5."

Later that day Fondren was interviewed by FBI agents and told them that he had a copy of the strategy document at his house and had taken it home because he did not have enough time to read it at work.

Fondren is expected to appear before a federal magistrate this afternoon at the federal court in Alexandria. Asa Hutchinson, the lawyer for Mr. Fondren, was not available for comment.

TahoeBlue

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #32 on: August 17, 2010, 12:26:59 pm »

Some updates:

http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/crime/3404-chinese-spying-in-the-unitedstates
Chinese Spying in the United States

Written by Alex Newman     
Tuesday, 27 April 2010 00:00 

A secret FBI videotape showing the transfer of classified military documents to a communist Chinese agent was released in February to the world, providing a brief peek at the shadowy world of espionage against America. Pentagon analyst Gregg Bergersen with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is shown receiving a wad of bills and telling People’s Republic of China spy Tai Shen Kuo that he’s “very reticent” to let him have the information “because it’s all classified.”
...
In February, another Chinese spy was sentenced to 15 years in jail for stealing sensitive secrets from his former employers — Boeing and Rockwell International — and passing them to the communist regime. Engineer Dongfan “Greg” Chung reportedly gave up trade secrets about American space shuttles, military aircraft, and even the Delta IV rocket. Though Chung was 73 years old, the judge said he handed out the possible life sentence as a message to the Chinese government: “Stop sending your spies here.”
...
Chung was reportedly aided in his crimes by Chi Mak, a former defense-contractor engineer. Mak was convicted of conspiring to pass sensitive military technology to the PRC, including information on Navy ships, nuclear submarines, and more.“We will never know the full extent of the damage that Mr. Mak has done to our national security,” wrote the judge, who sentenced Mak to 24 years. His family later pled guilty to related criminal charges.

These are just a few of the more recently convicted PRC spies operating in the United States. The FBI has arrested dozens of Chinese on American soil in recent years for involvement in espionage operations on behalf of the communist regime. And according to various reports, there are close to 500 similar investigations ongoing. The problem is indeed enormous.
...
In its 2007 annual report to Congress on the military power of the PRC, the Department of Defense explained that Chinese espionage is a critical threat. “Several high profile legal cases highlight China’s efforts to obtain sensitive U.S. technologies (e.g., missile, imaging, semiconductor, and submarine) illegally by targeting well-placed scientists and businessmen,” explained the report. “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials have rated China’s aggressive and wide-ranging espionage as the leading threat to U.S. technology.

Since 2000, ICE has initiated more than 400 investigations involving the illicit export of U.S. arms and technologies to China.”

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/24/eveningnews/main6137395.shtml

MOUNTAIN VIEW, Calif., Jan. 24, 2010
Google Not Only Target of China Hackers
Chinese Cyber-Spies Target Dozens of U.S. Companies, Experts Say, Stealing Valuable Trade Secrets
...
Google discovered this was much more than an attack on the e-mail of one Chinese human rights activist. Not only was Google itself a target of the cyber-spies, but so were at least 20 other major corporations.

"This is not a Google story," said Peter Navarro, author of "The Coming China Wars." "It is a story about industrial espionage, coming from China, attacking American business and our economy."
...
One of the huge drivers of Chinese economic growth over the last several decades has been the forced technology transfer from America to China," Navarro said.

While there is no proof the Chinese government itself was involved in the attacks, Tenzin Seldon says American companies hoping to profit in China should beware.

"It is not them that has owned China; it is China that has owned them," Seldon said.

Rebelitarian

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #33 on: August 30, 2010, 11:38:15 pm »

How hypocritical is that for the US to export all its jobs to China then get mad over technical components.

Pisser is that how much is the NWO letting through despite what Americans actual catch.

TahoeBlue

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #34 on: June 26, 2011, 04:07:19 pm »

Bump for Romney running for President - also notice that Hunter was running for prez in 2008 and he seems to have replaced Cunningham on the Armed Services Commitee....

see: http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=78572.msg441109#msg441109

 April 17, 2006, 1:06 PM Over the weekend, a new profile by Copley News Service added to our understanding of former GOP Rep. Randy "Duke" Cunningham's "Co-conspirator #3," the mysterious Thomas Kontogiannis. Today, we can add a bit more. Recall that Kontogiannis bribed Cunningham through purchasing a yacht from the congressman -- and paying several hundred thousand dollars more than it was worth. His finance company also handled some of Cunningham's questionable mortgages. But reporters and investigators have struggled to understand what Kontogiannis was getting from Duke for all the money he spent on the lawmaker. The latest theory seems to be that Duke was introducing him to world leaders
...

Bottom-line: MZM-Cunningham appears to be part of the American side to the monster scandal involving multi-billion dollar kickbacks from defense contractors to the Saudi Royal family, which has been in turn buying western politicians and intelligence officials for decades.

Over the years, the Yamamah slush fund has bankrolled a series of Saudi black operations from Pakistan's nuclear program, to the BCCI rip-off, to the Iran-Contra operation, to the creation of al-Qaeda and political influence buying in the US and UK by various factions of the Royal family.

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=89643.msg517745#msg517745
Case in point, Randall ‘Duke’ Cunningham -- he pleaded guilty to using his congressional office to accept bribes, kickbacks, money from the contractors he was voting to give government business. Cunningham right now is sitting in this federal prison in North Carolina, and getting his government pension, an estimated $64,000 a year, sent to a congressional felon sitting in the can."


Quote
HUNTER CALLS ON ROMNEY TO OPPOSE BAIN PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINESE COMPANY

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: November 2, 2007
CONTACT: Gary Becks (619) 334-1655, dlhunter08@yahoo.com

San Diego, CA - - - Presidential candidate and current Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Duncan Hunter, today called on former Governor Mitt Romney to send a "clear statement" to the leadership of the company he founded, Bain Capital, to terminate a proposed business deal with a controversial Chinese corporation seeking to acquire U.S. defense contractor 3COM. Bain Capital is attempting to form a business arrangement with Huawei Corporation, a Chinese corporation founded by an officer of the Peoples Liberation Army of Communist China, which faces allegations of assisting Saddam Hussein in the targeting of U.S. aircraft and in helping the Taliban develop surveillance equipment.

"I am extremely concerned that Governor Romney's company would tout a highly suspect Chinese corporation as a strategic partner," stated Hunter. "Forming a business partnership with a corporation known to have direct ties with terrorists and dictators while, at the same time, openly seeking to acquire a major U.S. corporation that performs vital cyber security work for the Department of Defense, can only be characterized as irresponsible."
 

TahoeBlue

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #35 on: May 20, 2012, 07:56:59 pm »

Gee really? - who da thunk it?

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/92d6032a-a108-11e1-9fbd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1vSP8XUnA
May 18, 2012 7:00 pm
China linked to ‘economic espionage
By Geoff Dyer in Washington

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92d6032a-a108-11e1-9fbd-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1vSPUGnJm
 
China is the world’s biggest supporter of “economic espionage”, the Pentagon says in its annual report on the Chinese military which also claimed that Beijing’s defence budget is much higher than official numbers.

Friday’s report said China would continue to be an “aggressive and capable” collector of sensitive US technological information, including that owned by defence-related companies, and represented a “growing and persistent threat to US national security”.


http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/19/us-usa-china-military-idUSBRE84I06X20120519
Chinese entities world's biggest economic spies: Pentagon
...
The Pentagon, in its annual report to Congress on China's military, flagged sustained investment last year in advanced missile technologies and cyber warfare capabilities and warned that Chinese spying threatened America's economic security.

"Chinese actors are the world's most active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage," the report said.

"Chinese attempts to collect U.S. technological and economic information will continue at a high level and will represent a growing and persistent threat to U.S. economic security."

David Helvey, acting assistant secretary for defense, stopped short of saying the Chinese government was behind cyber intrusions, and instead repeated that they were "from China."
...

TahoeBlue

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #36 on: May 29, 2013, 11:57:27 am »

Oh how am I surprised again? oh they say "cyber" hacking , but are we sure they don't have someone on the INSIDE?

http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Chinese_hackers_spying_on_US_weapons_programs_999.html
Chinese hackers spying on US weapons programs
 by Staff Writers
 Washington (AFP) May 28, 2013

Chinese hackers have gained access to secret designs for a slew of sophisticated US weapons programs, officials said Tuesday, possibly jeopardizing the American military's technological edge.

The breaches were part of a broad Chinese campaign of espionage against top US defense contractors and government agencies, officials said, confirming a Washington Post account of a Pentagon report.

The Defense Science Board, a senior advisory group with government and civilian experts, concluded that digital hackers had gained access to designs for two dozen major weapons systems critical to missile defenses, combat aircraft and naval ships, according to a Pentagon document cited by the Post.

The cyber spying gave China access to advanced technology and could weaken the US military's advantage in the event of a conflict, the board said.

The Pentagon advisory report stopped short of accusing Beijing of stealing the designs, but the conclusions help explain recent American warnings to the Chinese government.

"It's not clear how much of our stuff they got," a defense official told AFP on condition of anonymity.

The revelations of cyber espionage coincided with a report that Chinese hackers had stolen top-secret blueprints of Australia's new intelligence agency headquarters, including the layout for communications systems and server locations.
...

http://blog.heritage.org/2013/05/09/dod-china-report-reveals-comprehensive-military-buildup-espionage/
Pentagon Report on China Reveals Comprehensive Military Buildup, Extensive Espionage
Dean Cheng
May 9, 2013 at 10:51 am

The Department of Defense (DOD), per the requirements of the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), this week issued the 2013 annual report to Congress on the Chinese military. This year’s report is a substantial expansion upon the 2012 report, nearly double in length, and with an extensive discussion of a number of areas. In addition to reading the valuable information in its pages, Washington should be reminded just how absolutely necessary this report is.

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf

http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf


The most obvious takeaway is that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is engaged in a massive, extensive modernization program, drawing upon the resources of a constantly expanding economy (now the world’s second largest) to support improvements in not only the ground forces, but the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the Second Artillery (China’s rocket forces), as well as space and cyber capabilities.

The report provides details of various new ship classes, new fighters, new missiles, and improvements in Chinese space assets. Far from having to choose between guns or butter, the PLA is, in the words of my economics counterpart Derek Scissors, “buying guns soaked in butter.”

Even more important, this year’s report specifically charges the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the PLA with engaging in cyber actions directed against the United States. “China is using its computer network exploitation (CNE) capability to support intelligence collection against the US diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors,” the report says.
...

Finally, there is an odd juxtaposition in this year’s report. On the one hand, there is extensive discussion of Chinese military diplomacy, including the range of Chinese bilateral and multilateral military exercises, as well as military-to-military exchanges, visits, etc. This is alongside a remarkably detailed review of Chinese espionage, both human and cyber. A number of Chinese spies are identified, as well as their targets.

What is left unstated is why the U.S. intends, in light of the concerns about espionage, to facilitate Chinese military diplomacy, such as the invitation to the PLA to attend the 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises. These large, multilateral exercises, involving many of America’s closest allies in the Pacific engaging in real-world combat training (e.g., torpedo attacks, air defense operations) would seem to be a cornucopia of information for Chinese intelligence.

Sasha

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #37 on: June 04, 2013, 04:25:31 pm »

Bump for relevance.

Good thread.  Lots of 'wows' in there.
Morality is contraband in war.
- Mahatma Gandhi

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #38 on: November 01, 2013, 02:13:24 pm »

What are they aiming at?

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/31/inside-china-nuclear-submarines-capable-of-widespr/

Inside China: Nuclear submarines capable of widespread attack on U.S.

Chinese state-run media revealed for the first time this week that Beijing’s nuclear submarines can attack American cities as a means to counterbalance U.S. nuclear deterrence in the Pacific.

On Monday, leading media outlets including China Central TV, the People’s Daily, the Global Times, the PLA Daily, the China Youth Daily and the Guangmin Daily ran identical, top-headlined reports about the “awesomeness” of the People's Liberation Army navy’s strategic submarine force.

“This is the first time in 42 years since the establishment of our navy’s strategic submarine force that we reveal on such a large scale the secrets of our first-generation underwater nuclear force,” the Global Times said in a lengthy article titled “China for the First Time Possesses Effective Underwater Nuclear Deterrence against the United States.”

The article features 30 photos and graphics detailing, among other things, damage projections for Seattle and Los Angeles after being hit by Chinese nuclear warheads and the deadly radiation that would spread all the way to Chicago.

China’s sub fleet is reportedly the world’s second-largest, with about 70 vessels. About 10 are nuclear-powered, and four or more of those are nuclear ballistic submarines capable of launching missiles.




...
China also has developed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles — notably the DF-31A, which has a range of 7,000 to 7,500 miles.

“If we launch our DF 31A ICBMs over the North Pole, we can easily destroy a whole list of metropolises on the East Coast and the New England region of the U.S., including Annapolis, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Portland, Baltimore and Norfolk, whose population accounts for about one-eighth of America’s total residents,” the Global Times said.

All the state-run press reports stressed the point that the PLA’s missile submarines are now on routine strategic patrol, “which means that China for the first time has acquired the strategic deterrence and second strike capability against the United States.”

“Our JL-2 SLBMs have become the fourth type of Chinese nuclear missiles that threaten the continental United States, after our DF-31A, DF-5A and DF-5B ICBMs,” said the Global Times.


Hilldog...
Elites' writing about elites' - Dan Blumenthal is on the China Technology Board!

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/07/23/what_clinton_left_unfinished_in_asia
Clinton's unfinished business

 Posted By Daniel Blumenthal    Friday, July 23, 2010 - 4:16 PM

...

China Spying


http://www.aei.org/scholar/dan-blumenthal/



Dan Blumenthal is the director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American relations.  Mr. Blumenthal has both served in and advised the U.S. government on China issues for over a decade.  From 2001 to 2004, he served as senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense.  Additionally, he served as a commissioner on the congressionally-mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission since 2006-2012, and held the position of vice chairman in 2007.  He has also served on the Academic Advisory Board of the congressional U.S.-China Working Group. Mr. Blumenthal is the co-author of "An Awkward Embrace: The United States and China in the 21st Century" (AEI Press, November 2012).


http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/12340
A Sino-American Proxy War?
 Posted By Daniel Blumenthal   Wednesday, September 18, 2013
...
A public debate about a U.S. military strategy for China is most welcome. While the debate's particulars are important, it is equally significant that the U.S. national security community is now openly discussing ways to deter Chinese aggression and defeat it should deterrence fail.

This was hardly the case just a decade ago. Most in the U.S. national security elite were dismissive of China's military capabilities and believed that even talking about possibilities of conflict with China was provocative. Not only was this line of argument misguided -- taking seriously the possibility of conflict with China should lead to more robust deterrence and reassurance -- but it also wished away the fact that the Chinese security elite had been thinking about war with the United States for a long time.

If Washington is now more or less settled on a policy of engaging China while balancing its power and hedging against greater aggression, it is incumbent upon national security leaders to think as much about the balance and hedge part of the equation as they do the engage side. In an attempt to fill this gap, the Defense Department has developed a new concept, Air-Sea Battle (ASB). While much of ASB is classified, enough has been said to piece together its various moving parts. The operational concept requires that the U.S. military position itself to: 1) operate in an environment in which Chinese cyber-, anti-satellite, and electronic forces are seeking to degrade the C4ISR network upon which U.S. military effectiveness has become so reliant; 2) create better synergies between naval and air forces so they can effectively combat "anti-access" forces; and 3) hit targets on China's mainland to end Chinese salvos against U.S. allies and interests.

ASB is a direct descendent of the Cold War's AirLand Battle concept. Then, defense planners were worried that Soviet forces could quickly overrun allied forces at the central front of the Cold War -- Western Europe. AirLand Battle took a more offensive approach against the Soviet Union, using joint air and army forces to attack the Warsaw Pact states and targeting forces deep in Soviet- held territories before they had a chance to stage mass sweeps into Europe.
...

A public debate about a U.S. military strategy for China is most welcome. While the debate's particulars are important, it is equally significant that the U.S. national security community is now openly discussing ways to deter Chinese aggression and defeat it should deterrence fail.

This was hardly the case just a decade ago. Most in the U.S. national security elite were dismissive of China's military capabilities and believed that even talking about possibilities of conflict with China was provocative. Not only was this line of argument misguided -- taking seriously the possibility of conflict with China should lead to more robust deterrence and reassurance -- but it also wished away the fact that the Chinese security elite had been thinking about war with the United States for a long time.

If Washington is now more or less settled on a policy of engaging China while balancing its power and hedging against greater aggression, it is incumbent upon national security leaders to think as much about the balance and hedge part of the equation as they do the engage side. In an attempt to fill this gap, the Defense Department has developed a new concept, Air-Sea Battle (ASB). While much of ASB is classified, enough has been said to piece together its various moving parts. The operational concept requires that the U.S. military position itself to: 1) operate in an environment in which Chinese cyber-, anti-satellite, and electronic forces are seeking to degrade the C4ISR network upon which U.S. military effectiveness has become so reliant; 2) create better synergies between naval and air forces so they can effectively combat "anti-access" forces; and 3) hit targets on China's mainland to end Chinese salvos against U.S. allies and interests.

ASB is a direct descendent of the Cold War's AirLand Battle concept. Then, defense planners were worried that Soviet forces could quickly overrun allied forces at the central front of the Cold War -- Western Europe. AirLand Battle took a more offensive approach against the Soviet Union, using joint air and army forces to attack the Warsaw Pact states and targeting forces deep in Soviet- held territories before they had a chance to stage mass sweeps into Europe.
...

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf
FOREWORD: The Air-Sea Battle Concept

http://www.cipe.org/content/william-reinsch
William A. Reinsch

Bill Reinsch currently serves as President of the National Foreign Trade Council. The NFTC, founded in 1914, is the oldest and largest business association dedicated solely to trade policy, export finance, international tax, and human resource issues. The organization represents 300 companies through its offices in New York and Washington, D.C. As president, Reinsch oversees NFTC’s efforts in favor of open markets, in support of Eximbank and OPIC, against unilateral sanctions and in support of sound international tax policy, among many other international trade and tax issues of concern to U.S. business. Concurrently, Mr. Reinsch also serves as a member of the U.S.-China Security Review Commission.

Prior to joining the NFTC, Reinsch served as the Under Secretary for Export Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. In that position he administered and enforced the export control policies and anti-boycott laws of the U.S. government and monitored the condition of the nation’s defense industrial base. Prior to taking this position, Mr. Reinsch spent twenty years on Capitol Hill from 1973 to 1993, most of them as senior Legislative Assistant to the late Senator John Heinz and subsequently to Senator John D. Rockefeller IV. He received a B.A. in International Relations from The Johns Hopkins University and an M.A. degree from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He lives in Bethesda, Maryland, with his wife and two sons.


http://www.c-spanvideo.org/williamareinsch


2009 Report to Congress of the U. S. -China Economic and Security Review Commission
 edited by Carolyn Bartholomew 


http://www.uscc.gov/content/carolyn-bartholomew



Carolyn Bartholomew was reappointed to the Commission by House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi for a sixth two-year term expiring on December 31, 2013. She previously served as the Commission’s chairman for the 2007 and 2009 Report cycles and served as vice chairman for the 2010, 2008, and 2006 Report cycles.

Commissioner Bartholomew has worked at senior levels in the U.S. Congress, serving as counsel, legislative director, and chief of staff to now House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi. She was a professional staff member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and also served as a legislative assistant to then U.S. Representative Bill Richardson.

In these positions, Commissioner Bartholomew was integrally involved in developing U.S. policies on international affairs and security matters. She has particular expertise in U.S.-China relations, including issues related to trade, human rights, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Ms. Bartholomew led efforts in the establishment and funding of global AIDS programs and the promotion of human rights and democratization in countries around the world. She was a member of the first Presidential Delegation to Africa to Investigate the Impact of HIV/AIDS on Children and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Congressional Staff Roundtable on Asian Political and Security Issues.


In addition to U.S.-China relations, her areas of expertise include terrorism, trade, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, U.S. foreign assistance programs, and international environmental issues. She is the Vice President for Development and Corporate Initiatives for the BlueGreen Alliance, and also serves on the board of directors of the Kaiser Aluminum Corporation and the nonprofit organization Asia Catalyst.

Commissioner Bartholomew received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Minnesota, a Master of Arts in Anthropology from Duke University, and a Juris Doctorate from Georgetown University Law Center. She is a member of the State Bar of California.


http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/ChinainU
Role of China in U.S. Economy
Nov 23, 2008

Carolyn Bartholomew talked about China’s role in the U.S. economy, focusing on current U.S. debt held by China and trade imbalances with the country. She responded to telephone calls and electronic mail.

TahoeBlue

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Re: China Spying - Technology Transfers History
« Reply #39 on: January 12, 2014, 04:28:16 pm »

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/12/honeywell-investigation-chinese-made-parts-warplanes
Honeywell under investigation for Chinese-made parts in US warplanes

• Sensors and magnets for F-35 fighter jet were made in China
• Pentagon issued waivers to ban on Chinese-made components


Reuters in Washington
theguardian.com, Sunday 12 January 2014 09.28 EST

The US Justice Department is investigating export and import procedures at Honeywell International Inc after the firm included Chinese parts in equipment it built for the F-35 fighter jet, three sources familiar with the matter said.

Reuters last week reported that the Pentagon twice waived laws banning Chinese-built components in US weapons in 2012 and 2013 for parts supplied by Honeywell for the $392bn Lockheed Martin Corp F-35 programme.

New details have now emerged about one of those waivers, which involved simple thermal sensors that Honeywell initially produced in Scotland before moving that production line to China in 2009 and 2010. The other waivers involved high-performance magnets built in China and elsewhere.

Federal agents from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, a law enforcement arm of the Pentagon, are working with prosecutors on the case, a person briefed on the matter said. The DCIS and the Pentagon declined to comment.

The precise nature of the investigation could not be confirmed. Typically, however, DCIS export investigations focus on whether a company violated the Arms Control Export Act by sending overseas products or technical specifications for items on the US Munitions List without first obtaining a US government licence. The sensors and F-35 specifications in this case may be subject to the US Munitions List. In terms of import violations, DCIS often investigates whether companies have engaged in fraud by misleading the Pentagon as to the origin of foreign parts.

The case throws a spotlight on the reliance of American companies, even in sensitive areas, on China as a manufacturing base for basic components. In the past 20 years, much production has been shifted out of the United States to lower-cost areas, particularly China.

...